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Introduction
To accept the necessity for development, one must first accept one’s
relative inferiority and inadequacy and the need to evolve and advance
towards something else.1
Globalization is said to be the defining convention of the new millennium.2 For
the Third World, however,3 development is the most important concept in the
international system, for it is development that defines and locates the Third World
within the international community.4 Whether praised or excoriated, defended or
condemned, “development” shapes and dominates most thinking about Third World
nations.5 Indeed, the peoples and nations of the world have come to be characterized in
terms of their development or lack thereof. Development has evolved into an essentially
incontestable paradigm with such a powerful hold on our collective imaginations that it is
almost impossible to think around it.
Since the advent of “development” in the early 1950s, Third World nations have
demanded more meaningful assistance from monetarily richer countries and more control
over their political and economic destinies.

Their demands have been largely rejected

and/or ignored, and the assistance that has been made available has been accompanied by
countless conditions. These conditions have often yielded disastrous results, including
ever-mounting debt for numerous Third World governments and increasing deprivation
for the very people the development project purports to assist.6 Even when measured in
terms of its own stated goals and objectives, development has, for the most part, failed.7
As “experts” have promulgated widely varying and often contradictory theories and
strategies, it has become increasingly apparent that they do not in fact know how to
achieve the objectives that ostensibly define their expertise.8
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This article does not contend, however, that the experts need only devise the
appropriate strategy, nor does it simply critique micro-development, civil participation,
market-led development, sustainable development, gender and development or other
current variations in an exceedingly long list of variations on the development theme.
We do not assert that money is all that is needed,9 or that industrialized countries need
only assume their responsibility to bring civilization to the desperate masses of the Third
World.10 Rather, we challenge and interrogate the very concept of development.
Development is a set of practices and beliefs that are part of the Western political
and cultural imagination, despite being presented as universal, natural and inevitable.
The development paradigm comprises a pervasive and largely unquestioned set of
interlocking ideological assumptions that must be exposed and then questioned. It
presumes a universal and superior way of ordering society, and that all societies are to
advance toward the same goal. Local and indigenous cultures, economies, self-concepts,
and ways of existing are largely without value in this discourse (notwithstanding recent
attempts at “local participation”), for the entire development project is premised on its
subjects “developing” into something else – and that something else is the West.11 Thus,
in the name of modernization, cultures have been destroyed, communities uprooted or
eradicated, and whatever sovereignty emerging nations possessed has virtually
disappeared.12
The concept of development privileges certain societies, cultures and institutions,
while disparaging others; it is grounded in defining the “Other” as incompetent, inferior
and in need of transformation. That most “undeveloped” people are people of color only
reinforces the Western view of the developing world as essentially dysfunctional, for it
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comports with American views of brown and black people in the United States. For
Europeans the development project continues the colonial civilizing mission.13 Taking up
where colonialism and the “White man’s burden” left off, the development project
provides the legal and moral justification for substantial interventions in the affairs of
those who have been categorized as underdeveloped.14

It justifies and supports the

economic and political status quo and the imbalance of international power, and it renders
the underdeveloped powerless, for it is the developers who name subjects, problems and
solutions. The objective in the following pages is to construct and then deconstruct the
concept of development, and to question whether development is so fundamentally
flawed that it should be abandoned in favor of a post-development paradigm.
Part I constructs the theory of development, beginning with the discovery of
global poverty after the Second World War. It establishes how poverty is in some
respects socially contingent, and how the notion of global poverty suddenly homogenized
and problematized the lives of the majority of the world’s peoples. With the impending
Cold War and the disintegration of colonial empires as crucial backdrops, industrialized
nations set out to eradicate poverty and bring the benefits of modernization to the
impoverished masses of the newly de-colonizing world, and thus development as we now
know it was born. From its inception, development was informed and shaped by the
meta-narrative of modernization, which is explored as the primary theoretical foundation
for the undertakings that were to follow.15 Law and development is also analyzed as the
legal manifestation of modernization theory and as an additional theoretical underpinning
of development.
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Part II explores how development has been constructed in practice. It begins with
the international financial institutions that form the institutional edifice of the
development project with particular emphasis on the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. It then focuses on the succession of often-contradictory economic
experiments and development theories that have emanated from these and other
institutions. Development theories have run the gamut as sustainable development,
micro-development, women- centered development, endogenous development,
appropriate development, ‘Basic Needs’, and both state and market-led development have
all had their days in the sun.16 What began as economic growth to eradicate poverty
evolved to include “enhancing participatory democratic processes”, “enlarging choices”,
“affording the opportunity to develop to one’s fullest potential”, “participation in
decisions affecting one’s life”, and affording the “means to carry out national
development goals and promote economic growth, equity and national self-reliance”.17
One consistent theme, however, is that the development project has grown ever larger
and more comprehensive. More disturbingly, international financial institutions now
determine policy in many Third World countries – much in the way colonial powers once
did.18 Yet, despite myriad inconsistencies and the well-documented pain and disasters
that have resulted from their strategies, these institutions and the concept of development
enjoy continuing and largely uncritical support within the international community.
Part III turns to legal constructions of development and the seriatim attempts by
Third World nations, over the past fifty years, to use international law in the pursuit of
development. These efforts began with the demand for Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, and then turned to broader demands for a New International
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Economic Order. When these failed, Southern nations asserted a Right to Development,
seeking to incorporate development into the burgeoning rights discourse. Reparations are
the most recent evolution in the campaign for economic justice, as some Third World
nations now demand compensation for the exploitation and crippling consequences of
slavery and colonialism. To the extent that these initiatives sought to establish legal
obligations for the West, they have been unsuccessful. As this section demonstrates,
international law has only reinforced and reproduced the economic and political
inequities present in the international economic system.
Part IV turns to deconstructing the discourse of development, demonstrating that
it is a method of conceptualizing the world that, in turn, shapes the world.19 Although
portrayed as a neutral and universal concept, development is planned, directed and
controlled by specific international and national institutions that act in ideological concert
and reflect the views and interests of certain communities, societies and cultures. This
ideology creates and defines the “Other” while providing the legal and moral rationale for
interventions that locate and cement the Third World on the lower rungs of the
international system. Development is the product of a particular perspective and that
perspective problematizes and homogenizes the majority of humanity. Deconstructing
this discourse suggests that it is at least possible to imagine a post-development world
and to perceive the people of the Third World in a fresh light.
Given the failures of development, the power relations it engenders, and its
generally negative and degrading view of non-Western peoples and cultures, Part V
attempts the very difficult task of envisioning a different approach to thinking about the
world. No new meta-narrative or grandiose strategy to replace the development
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paradigm is proposed, for we aim to reject, rather than substitute, meta-narratives.20 Nor
is it our objective to glorify and resurrect Third World traditions, for tradition is seldom
faultless and idyllic.21 Third world peoples have had varied and complex encounters with
development. These experiences must not be over-simplified.22 Our objective is to begin
to envision approaches that accord agency to the people development presumes to assist.
We hope that these alternative visions can somehow give voice to the local, including the
voice to embrace, transform, reject or otherwise engage the West and the entire
modernization project. We believe the West must abdicate some of the power it has
presumed and to begin to re-imagine the lives and agency of others, and in the process
perhaps reject often unarticulated but crippling assumptions about “the Other.”23 The
objective is to pose different questions, to let others pose questions, to learn to listen and
to actually hear the responses of others rather than assuming that the answers are already
known.

I. Constructing Development in Theory
A. The Birth of a Paradigm
It is difficult to imagine a world without development, for it seems as if
development has always been one of the fundamental criteria by which nations and
peoples are defined. In fact, however, the contemporary concept of development has a
quite short history. 24 Notions of progress and growth have been part of Western
discourse for well over a hundred years and, more generally, since the enlightenment.
“Development” as it is currently construed (i.e., modernization and national economic
growth), however, is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon.25 In 1949, President
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Harry Truman proposed a “fair deal” aimed at improving the lives of people inhabiting
the underdeveloped areas of the globe. In his now famous Point IV Program, he
declared:
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more
prosperous areas.26
Truman’s declaration profoundly changed the manner in which the people of what would
eventually become the Third World were viewed. In a sense, he created the
“underdeveloped world.”27 In the West this new perception of self and “the other” found
immediate acceptance.28 “Billions of diverse and complex peoples were suddenly
identified, homogenized and defined as backward, miserable victims” who would be
rescued by the West.29 This perspective continues to define the development project.
Truman also proposed that the industrialized world should undertake to alleviate the
newfound poverty in the underdeveloped world, but this call to action was a selfinterested one on the part of the United States. Many American policy makers thought
that if poor countries were not liberated from their poverty, they would be vulnerable to
“communist subversion”.30 Consequently, bringing “progress” to the Third World was
an integral part of the struggle against the Soviet Union and international communism.31
The development paradigm also originated within the context of collapsing colonial
empires and a global economy dominated by the United States.32 As a result, the U.S.
had a profound influence on the funding, objectives and approaches of the international
financial institutions established at the end of the Second World War. These institutions
– mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – are at the center of
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development theory and practice.33 Completing this scenario were Western beliefs in the
ultimate superiority of Western culture, values and people, and the explicit and implicit
racism that often persuaded the United States and former colonial powers that they had
the right to intervene in politically weaker, poorer and darker countries. Development
provided the legal and political means, as well the moral justification for interventions
that under other circumstances would probably have been considered impermissible.34
B. The Discovery and Quantification of Global Poverty
If President Truman discovered global poverty, then the World Bank quantified it
in 1948 by defining countries with an annual per capita income below $100 as poor.
Two-thirds of the world’s peoples were instantly impoverished.35 Once annual per capita
income was the gauge, the discernment of global poverty became “a comparative
statistical operation.”36 Entire nations were regarded as poor because of their overall
income.37 “Poor countries” came to be defined as those lacking the “wealth of more
economically advantaged nations,”38 and because industrialized countries were the points
of reference, the gap was enormous.39 Eradicating global poverty, as well as the
expanding disparity between industrialized and unindustrialized countries, became an
important challenge facing the international community.40 Of course, it is entirely
plausible to maintain that President Truman and the World Bank were only stating the
obvious, and articulating the willingness of the United States to lead Western countries in
tackling a very real problem. It can also be argued, however, that in certain significant
respects poverty itself is a social construct, and in some senses an invention.41 While
most definitions of poverty emphasize a lack of something or some deficiency, such
definitions only demonstrate the basic relativity of the concept, for if poverty is defined
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as lacking the necessities of life, it must be asked what is necessary, and who is to
determine necessities.42 In the end, this question was answered by defining necessity in
reference to the West; Third World nations and peoples were found to be sorely lacking.
Once problematized, poverty became the defining characteristic of the Third
World, and the “agreed” solution was economic growth and development.43 Indeed, the
Third World increasingly became part of a “system of thought and practice where
particular interventions to eradicate poverty became central to the world order.”44 While
traditional responses to poverty were based on “the pluralistic, culturally established and
holistic perceptions of each particular space, post-war programs of action represented a
universalistic, one-track, income-based and culturally lacking recipe for abstract
solutions.”45 The perception of a global economy that would save the world’s poor
“reinforced and legitimized pauperizing economic and political systems,” and led the
victims of these systems to view their particular situation in the same terms.46 As more
people came to trust that poverty could be eradicated through adopting (and, more
recently, integratng into) a “modern economy,” the search for modes of life and social
organization based on simplicity, or on voluntary or moral forms of poverty were
devalued and discredited.”47
People now identified as impoverished may have viewed themselves and their
place within their respective communities quite differently before the advent of
“development,” 48 as most societies had found ways of “defining and treating poverty that
accommodated visions of community, frugality and sufficiency.” 49 Professor Nanda
Shrestha, writing of “becoming a development category,” describes one such different
vision.50 Without romanticizing the pre-development period, Professor Shrestha paints a
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complex picture of his village, his family and his life in 1940s Nepal. He begins by
describing life in Nepal before “development,” where his family was extremely poor by
World Bank standards. Nonetheless, neither his family nor others in the village thought
that people were lesser beings because of their poverty. This is not to say that life was
idyllic and indeed he notes elements of a type of caste system, which he does not defend.
Yet, Professor Shrestha also observes a sense of responsibility and a community that
protected even the very poor, such as his family, from utter destitution.
While most traditional societies rejected the idea that poverty necessarily reflected
personal inadequacy, this belief was a major component of the new international value
system. 51 Within this new paradigm economic poverty was perceived and acted upon as
a disgrace and a scourge.52 Accordingly, with development, the poverty experienced by
Professor Shrestha and his family became a problem to be solved, and development
experts were thought to have the solution. All that the Nepalese brought to the table was
summarily discarded by those who assumed that the culture, knowledge, wisdom, insight
and judgment that Nepalese villagers brought to their own lives and existence was for the
most part worthless. In some ways the villagers came to believe this of themselves. The
Nepalese began to want to be like the developers. In the end, development plans and
strategies did not actually lessen poverty, but they did diminish self-sufficiency and a
sense of community, as functions that were formerly the collective responsibility of the
community were now left to the developers.53
The purpose of this account is not to romanticize poverty or to champion nonWestern societies per se, nor is it to suggest that societies and cultures are fixed and
impervious to change. It is also understood that there are concrete aspects to poverty;
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that poverty and want are not entirely socially constructed. It is only to suggest that
people existed and lived before the West came to their rescue, and they may have devised
a variety of internal mechanisms to deal with those who had less, even if those
mechanisms were imperfect.54 The possible value of such indigenous knowledge was not
even considered as the Western concept of development was deployed. Poverty was the
singular factor by which the development project categorized peoples that were actually
distinct, varied and in many instances quite self-sufficient. As poverty became their
defining characteristic, development became the obvious solution, to be pursued by
following the path of the West toward the goal of modernization.
C. The Meta-Narrative of Modernization
The road to development is littered with discarded models and philosophies, but
at the heart of all development theories is the belief that the Third World should follow in
the footsteps of the West.55 Development began as a quest for “modernity,”56 and while
development’s history is complex, the modernization project has consistently been at its
core.57 Modernization has been defined as “the process by which a society comes to be
characterized by a belief in the rational and scientific control of man’s physical and social
environment and the application of technology to that end.”58 All societies purportedly
pass through distinct phases at they modernize.59 The Rostow blueprint, for example,
mandated five stages, the first being traditional society, which possessed limited science,
technology and output per person; the second, where modern science leads to increased
production in agriculture and industry; and the third “take-off” stage where obstacles to
growth are transcended, new technology becomes predominant and growth becomes selfgenerating. More refined and complex processes mark the last two phases, as original
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industries are eclipsed and societies finally reach the level of high mass consumption.
All societies are believed to traverse this particular path – that is, the progression is fixed
and uni-linear.60 Early theorists could not agree on how modernization would actually
occur, 61 although they did agree that it was essential to approximate the characteristics of
the nations that comprised the industrialized Western world.62 It was therefore assumed
that tradition was an impediment to modernization, and Third World countries were
encouraged to abandon their traditional lifestyles, beliefs and value systems in favor of
“modern” Western norms and values.63
The modernization discourse has had an enormous impact, and has persisted for
several reasons including its compatibility with dominant neoclassical economic theories,
as well as its simplicity and purported universality. Perhaps another part of its appeal is
its apparent optimism, for it represents a belief in “progress.”64 During the United
Nations proclaimed “Development Decade” of the 1960s, however, modernization
produced only minimal improvements in the material conditions of life in the Third
World. Eventually, initial modernization strategies were declared failures.65
Notwithstanding this inauspicious beginning, however, modernization theory remains the
meta-narrative that informs all other development narratives. Modernization continues to
enjoy the unflagging support of major international financial institutions and other key
national and international organizations that devise development strategies and allocate
development resources.66 It is also a key component of “law and development” theory
which, through multiple incarnations, has been the consistent companion of
modernization.67
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D. Law and Development
Western legal scholars entered the development discourse through an offshoot of
modernization theory known as law and development.68 While modernization theorists
equated Westernization and development, law and development theorists focused on the
Westernization of Third World legal systems as a key prerequisite to, and catalyst for,
development. Both theories shared the underlying premise that the Westernization of
Third World countries was essential for – indeed, was the essence of – development.69
Law and development theorists supposed that adopting Western legal systems would
facilitate development by providing the necessary elements for a functioning market
system.70 Westernizing the legal infrastructure of Third World countries was expected to
create neutral, more accessible and more responsive government institutions.71 Benefits
would include increased equality, freedom and participation, and these would in turn
foster improved material standards of living.72 These benefits would then “trickle down”
to the poorest of the poor.73
Despite its strong and promising start, the law and development movement that
began in the early 1960s lasted little more than a decade.74 Perhaps the most significant
factor in its demise was the rupture of the coalition that had given the movement the
appearance of unanimity. Western academics and practitioners who were the initial
proponents of law and development had enjoyed an initially positive reception from
Third World leaders and elites – many of whom were Western educated.75 By the early
1970s, however, many political leaders and intellectuals in the Third World had turned to
dependency theory and other radical analyses of their circumstances, and were
demanding a New International Economic Order. 76 In this context, law and development
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was widely denounced as “reflect[ing] the ideological hegemony of Western capitalism
and the dominant economic forces of contemporary imperialism. …[and] as inadequate to
explain development or underdevelopment…”77 Moreover, although the American
experience was thought to exemplify the success of law and development, many
observers expressed “doubt that the model accurately describe[d] legal life even in the
United States.”78
Long after widespread reports of the movement’s demise, however, the core
premises of law and development continue to inform most Western thinking (both
popular and official) about development. 79 Indeed, with economic globalization as its
battering ram, the law and development movement recast and reasserted itself in the
1990s as “marketization” and “democratization.”80 The current reincarnation of the law
and development movement is known as the “good governance” agenda, which has been
critiqued as “an uneasy combination of two main objectives: on the one hand, a project
limiting the power of the state in the economy while simultaneously expanding the role of
the market and on the other, establishing liberal democracy as a counterpart to structural
adjustment or neoliberal economic reform.”81 Capital exporting countries and the
international financial institutions they control are actively promoting the good
governance agenda.82 Like the modernization paradigm that is at its core, law and
development continues to thrive, albeit in a new form.
Thus, as the first half of the Twentieth Century came to a close, a new entity was
emerging in the international community, the underdeveloped world. Once it was
discovered and then defined as poor and pre-modern, the foundation was in place for its
development. As the second half of the 20th century progressed, “development” became
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the stated objective of virtually every country in what became the Third World. New
nations differed on the question of how best to achieve development, but they
unanimously agreed that development was their goal.83 International institutions, in turn,
propounded a variety of mechanisms to assist newly sovereign entities as they moved in
the expected linear fashion towards the promised goal of being developed. Part II turns
to the development institutions and the practices they propounded.

II. Constructing Development in Practice
A. The Institutional Edifice
The International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) have come to exercise a profound
influence on the economies of most Third World countries.84 Indeed, International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) virtually control the policy-making processes of some debtor
countries.85 When they were established at the end of World War II, 86 however, the
World Bank was to assist in rebuilding post War Europe and the IMF was to monitor and
regulate the international monetary system. Their evolution into institutions whose
primary focus is the Third World is a crucial aspect of the evolving paradigm of
development.87
1. The World Bank
When the World Bank was founded at the end of World War II, its assigned
priority was rebuilding Europe.88 In 1947, however, just three years after the Bank’s
creation, the United States embarked on the Marshall Plan and took over most of the
financing for the reconstruction of Europe. With its role in Europe eclipsed, 89 the Bank
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was left to pursue its secondary charge: “the development of productive facilities and
resources in less developed countries.”90 But even this function, as originally
contemplated, bears little resemblance to the Bank’s contemporary role in the Third
World. The World Bank was intended to act as an intermediary between prospective
borrowers and prospective investors, meaning it was to play the traditional role of a
private, commercial bank – except that its depositors and borrowers would be member
states.91 Under the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank was to make loans based
exclusively on “considerations of economy and efficiency;”92 it was expressly prohibited
from entertaining “political or other non-economic influences or considerations.”93
The Bank’s evolution into an Institution that touches on almost all aspects of the
economic, social and political lives of its borrowers has much to do with how
development itself has evolved over the last fifty years and with other factors such as the
post World War II struggle between capitalism and communism, a struggle within which
the World Bank was a critical weapon.94 With the establishment of the Inter-American
Development Bank in 1961, the shift began towards linking the extension of credit to the
implementation of reforms.95 This opened the door to broader interventions in the
political and social affairs of borrowing nations.96 The Bank eventually began insisting
on internal changes as a condition of receiving assistance. As the Bank’s role in devising
and carrying out both the practical and theoretical elements of development has
persistently expanded and grown, its position in the affairs of its Third World members
expanded in tandem, and steadily and consistently grew ever broader and deeper. 97
2. The Evolving IMF Role in the Third World
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The International Monetary Fund was initially founded to stabilize the
international monetary system and promote international trade,98 by supervising
international currency exchange rates and making short-term loans to member states
when necessary to meet balance of payments difficulties.99 Many factors contributed to
the subsequent transformation of the IMF’s role into a lender to Third World countries,
but perhaps the most important was the 1971 U.S. decision to “float” the dollar.100 This
determination caused such significant changes in the international monetary system that
the IMF was eventually reduced to monitoring exchange rates rather than setting them.101
Still, most IMF activity was directed toward industrialized nations until the oil crisis in
the early 1970s. Newly established Euro-Markets were flooded with so-called “petro
dollars,”102 and these markets usurped most of the IMF’s role as a lender to credit-worthy
industrialized states who could now avoid IMF conditions.103 As credit-worthy
borrowers sought loans elsewhere, the IMF found itself lending almost exclusively to
Third World countries.104 Indeed, since the second amendment of its Articles of
Agreement in 1978, the IMF has become primarily a lender to the Third World.105 This
new role was cemented by the debt crises of the 1980s, as the IMF assumed increasing
control over the economies of states that had no alternative sources of outside financing.
The Third World debt crisis in the 1980s also led the IMF and World Bank to effectively
consolidate their policies toward the Third World.106
IFI performance as “the apparatus of management and control of social reality in
the Third World”107 has provoked an intense barrage of criticism,108 ranging from liberal
critics who generally accept the goals and objectives of IFIs but perceive problems in
implementation,109 to those embracing a more radical perspective, who view IFIs as tools

Deconstructing Development – Gordon/Sylvester
Page 19 of 92
of the industrialized north in their continuing exploitation of the South. 110 Others reject
both critiques.111 What is certain, however, is the decisive and ever-expanding position
of these institutions in the “cycles of convention wisdom” that make up the ensuing
narrative of development.

B. Cycles of Conventional Wisdom112
The concept of development is “riddled with paradoxes, and few theories are
more bedeviled by contested hypotheses.”113 Development has taken many shapes and
forms since the 1950s, when economic growth was its sole objective. In the 1960s,
poverty alleviation and distributional equity were added as objectives. ‘Basic Needs’
emerged in the 1970s, and the cultural dimension took its place beside economic
development and more emphasis was placed on self-reliance.114 The 1980s brought
gender issues and environmentalism as prominent themes.115 By the 1990s, globalization
had become the focal point.116 While the following account attempts to break these and
many other permutations into discrete time frames, there is considerabe overlap.
Theories and practices sometimes evolved slowly; sometimes seemed to disappear, only
to reappear in a different form; and sometimes gave way to polar opposite strategies.
This brief account can only sketch how development has evolved and been transformed
and adjusted over the last fifty years, as developers tried and failed to “better humankind
through the alleviation of poverty and the realization of human potential.”117
1. The “Golden Age” of Development: 1950-1970118
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The 20-year period from 1950 to 1970 has been labeled the “golden age” of
development.119 The development project was in its infancy, but the clear “expert”
consensus was that insufficient income was the key problem facing Third World
countries, and economic growth was the solution.120 The prevailing orthodoxy postulated
that national economic management would maximize growth and employment;
accordingly, the state was to orchestrate development through the use of macroeconomic
policy tools.121

Early development theory relied heavily on “state-led

developmentalism.”122 National governments were to adopt policies that stimulated
growth.123 The standard approach to economic development involved highly abstract
plans, economic model building and parastatal agencies.124 Capital investment to build
infrastructure, industrialize and to generally modernize societies was thought to be the
most important ingredient in economic growth.125 Therefore, the World Bank extended
project-based loans to build dams, highways and other infrastructure projects.126
Technology was also a critical component and given the lack of capital to purchase it,
technical assistance became essential.127 As technology was introduced, Third World
social and cultural factors were ignored because Western developers believed technology
was culturally neutral and invariably beneficial. 128 Historical, institutional and economic
realities were generally disregarded in the early days of the development project.129
Very few of the early plans for economic growth led to measurable successes, and
it became apparent that the gains that were achieved would not automatically benefit the
most needy citizens within target countries.130 The “trickle down” theory, which
postulated that economic growth would necessarily shrink the gap between the rich and
the poor, proved to be untrue.131 As optimism regarding economic growth began to
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wane,132 Third World leaders began demanding permanent sovereignty over natural
resources133 and a school of thought known as “dependency theory” emerged offering a
radical critique of mainstream economics.134 Meanwhile, the Cold War between
capitalism and communism had become the dominant factor in global politics and the
primary consideration in U.S. policy toward the Third World.135
The perception grew that more coordination by international institutions would be
needed to execute what was becoming the ever more complex undertaking of
development.136 Thus, as the 1960s progressed (perhaps foreshadowing the
contemporary idea of “comprehensive development”), developmentalism became more
wide-ranging.137 Third World governments began to establish social programsthat
would more directly address poverty, byimproving housing, education, health, energy
and transportation.138 The World Bank began to support projects in these areas, as well
projects focusing on population control, nutrition and urban development.139 This
represented a significant change in Bank policy, as the Bank moved beyond lending
funds for profit-oriented projects towards funding social projects involving non-economic
policy choices. 140 Development had begun its expansion beyond economic growth.
2. The Second Phase: Integrating Social and Economic Elements
By the early 1970’s, the World Bank focused its resources and policies
exclusively on the Third World.141 What has been called the “second era of
development”142 was characterized by escalating efforts to integrate social considerations
into the pursuit of economic goals.143

It was conceded that the development strategies

then in place would not eliminate hunger and poverty, and “Basic Needs” became the
new maxim within the development community.144 Rather than focusing on the

Deconstructing Development – Gordon/Sylvester
Page 22 of 92
infrastructure and mega-projects that had previously dominated development strategies
and funding, the ‘Basic Needs’ approach proposed that poverty be dealt with by focusing
directly on food, clothing, shelter, education and employment.145 Moreover, people
whose basic needs were met might be less susceptible to “Communist subversion,”146
which was an important consideration during the Cold War. “Basic Needs” was quite
popular because it was universalistic, yet easily tailored to be country-specific;147 it
remained in favor until policies centered on the poor were abandoned in favor of
structural adjustment lending.148
Policy studies that examined processes, values and social consequences were
prominent during this phase.149 Moreover, the presumptions that policy-making was
exclusively a state activity and that Third World governments acted on behalf of their
respective populations, also began to be challenged.150 As developers explored ways to
deliver aid that would meet basic needs, Western non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) emerged to assist.151 “Grassroots development” and “empowerment” became
the mottos of the day, as “bottom up” theories such as micro-development, 152
endogenous development,153 sustainable development154 and other themes began to
emerge to replace “top down” theories.155
Indeed, as the 1970s progressed, “major problems, such as the environment, overpopulation, food scarcity, the role of women, habitat destruction and unemployment were
brought to the fore, and each new conundrum had an independent career that demanded
both public and institutional consideration.”156 What these numerous theories have in
common, however, is that they originated in the West, and more specifically the
international institutions that by this time defined, designed and controlled
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developmentalism. They often followed new domestic policy prescriptions and
emphases in the industrialized countries. For example, ‘Basic Needs’ followed on the
heels of the War on Poverty in the United States, which may have suggested the
model.157 Emphasis on the role of women in development cannot be separated from the
feminist movement in the United States. Environmental concerns surfaced as the
environment became an issue in the United States and Europe.158 This pedigree
highlights the extent to which policies are designed and imposed separate and apart from
the communities they purport to serve.159
On the other hand, the complex responses, both real and anticipated, of Third
World peoples to development interventions have cannot be discounted. The idea of
meeting ‘Basic Needs’ for example, was largely a response to Cold War concerns that
poor populations may be susceptible to communist subversion.160 Micro-development
and participation are partly in response to policy failures, but may also have been
responses to changing perceptions of the objects of development.161 Certainly, the
relationship between developers and the objects of development were and remain
complex. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that the majority of power has resided in the
developers, as the lost decade for development amply demonstrates.
3. The Third World Debt Crisis and the
“Lost Decade” for Development (1980-1990)
The 1980s are often termed development’s “lost decade”162 as a combination of
factors led to the debacle of structural adjustment.163 Chief among these factors was what
has come to be known as the Third World debt crisis, which even today remains a critical
issue.164 Most analysts trace the roots of the Third World debt crisis to the oil crises of
the early and mid 1970s, when spiking oil prices simultaneously impoverished oil-
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importing Third World countries and flooded international financial markets with oil
profits in need of investment.165 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(“OPEC”) became “a major creditor of the United States and Western Multinational
banks166 that in turn loaned the money to poor, often politically unstable Third World
countries.”167 Left with massive loans that carried skyrocketing interest rates, and at the
same time unable to raise sufficient revenues through exports to pay these debts, Third
World nations acquired growing deficits. 168
Structural adjustment became the method by which debtor countries were to
correct ballooning deficits.169 These programs transformed the IMF from an institution
that has been primarily concerned with stabilizing global exchange rates, into one deeply
involved in the social and political policies of the poorest countries of the Third World.170
IMF lending has always been conditional, but the short-term lending provisions originally
utilized by the IMF were thought inadequate to address the development problems faced
by Third World nations. So longer-term financing arrangements were implemented and
the IMF broadened its traditional scope of inquiry to include evaluations of domestic
issues such as labor, health care, and agriculture.171
By the mid-1980s, the World Bank had also begun to grant loans for adjustment
purposes.172 Loans were now being made to meet balance-of-payments difficulties
rather than for specific projects,173 and these loans were conditional on the debtor
nation’s promise to take certain steps to reform “inappropriate public policies”.174 These
loans were the Bank’s first foray into the domestic policies of its debtors, and were the
predecessor of structural adjustment programs (“SAPs”).175 Although the Bank had been
steadily embracing a broader vision of its role in the development process,176 it had yet to
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involve itself directly in the social or political affairs of its borrowers.177 As the
international debt crisis widened and deepened,178 however, the World Bank began to use
structural adjustment programs in an ever more intrusive way.179
The Bank concluded that the primary impediment to economic growth was Third
World government policies.180 Rather than relying entirely on macroeconomic
indicators,181 The World Bank began to condition its loans on Bank judgments regarding
an increasingly wide range of domestic policies.182 The World Bank was prohibited from
becoming involved in the politics of borrowing nations by its Articles of Agreement,183
so its growing role in the domestic policies of its borrowers was rationalized by broadly
interpreting the concept of “economic development.”184 Under this rubric, the World
Bank’s scope increased to encompass legal and judicial reform, family planning,
education, developing the private sector and health care, among various other
initiatives.185

Moreover, if structural adjustment conditions were not met, future

assistance could be denied186 and adherence to these conditions was critical in securing
access to private capital.187

Consequently, the pressure on countries facing economic

crisis to conform to SAP conditions was extraordinarily high.188
Some critics contend that SAPs amount to “economic coercion.”189 The have
caused legendary devastation.190 Structural adjustment led to severe deterioration in
living conditions,191 as cutbacks in government spending led to drastic declines in
medical service, public education and other services.192 This often led to violent protests
as basic necessities became unaffordable,193 and popular protests sometimes triggered
government repression. Structural adjustment thus came to be associated with
deteriorations in freedom and, at times, human rights abuses.194
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Some observers maintain that Structural Adjustment Programs were never
intended to achieve their stated purposes, but were only implemented to further Western
interests, such as the repayment of Third World debt to Western banks.195 Structural
adjustment, in part, entailed turning Third World countries into “favorable investment
climates” for multinational corporations.196 But this goal often conflicted with meeting
the basic needs of the general public,197 as did trade liberalization.198 But even when
viewed more favorably, SAPs and the conditions that they imposed curtailed the
governing capacity of member states by vastly limiting the range of available economic,
political and social policy options.199 Once a state accepted financial assistance from
World Bank or IMF entities, a great deal of state decision-making authority was
effectively delegated to these institutions,200 and the debtor nation, in effect, became an
instrument of the IFI, as lending officials exerted control over a wide range of domestic
sectors, including those entrusted with providing education, health care and social
services, and protecting the rights of the nation’s workforce.201 By shaping and
determining the policy choices available to governments, conditionalities foreclose
political prerogatives that are generally thought to constitute the core of state
sovereignty.202
Structural adjustment was in most respects a failure, for as the 1980s drew to a
close, developing countries were poorer, more debt-ridden, and even less able to provide
services such as education and health care. Governments were also facing angry
populations who were no longer able to obtain the most elementary goods and services.
Sovereign policy choices and prerogatives were increasingly limited and shaped by
international predilections emanating from international financial institutions and by the
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escalating rhetoric of globalization. The dramatic failure of SAPs in addressing the
economic disasters experienced by much of Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries
during the 1980s prompted yet another retooling of the IFI approach to the Third
World.203 It is in this environment that the “Washington Consensus” began to take shape.
4. The Washington “Consensus” and the “New” Conditionality204
The 1990s brought the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
making the United States the world’s sole superpower. With the demise of the Soviet
Union and China’s move towards a market economy, alternative economic models
disappeared and the political and economic views of the United States began to
completely dominate both theory and practice. Modernization was now defined as
integration into the global economy, and development as economic liberalization,
privatization and embracing the “free market”.205
The World Bank articulated the new orthodoxy in a series of reports that began in
1991 and culminated with its 1999 Report, “Entering Into the 21st Century”, which
consolidated a decade-long process of devising and defining what the World Bank termed
a Comprehensive Development Framework.206 With this report, development indeed
became all encompassing.207 According to the Bank, the underlying premise of the CDF
is that growth must include consideration of structural, 208 human,209 physical, 210 and
sector-specific211 aspects of development. All of these strategies were to be achieved
through market-friendly policies and market incentives.212 The necessary actors would
be governments, local organizations,213 and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).214
The CDF also co-opted development strategies previously termed “alternative”215 – such
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as environmental management, human resource development, building self-reliance,216
and concentrating on civil society, 217 social institutions, and human rights.218
The groundwork for the CDF was laid in the 1989 Report, Sub-Saharan Africa:
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, which introduced “good governance” as a
programmatic priority.219 Defined as an initiative to build pluralistic institutions that
would perform functions in much the same manner as Western governments,220 good
governance also emphasized privatization and “marketization”, as opposed to
government regulation of the economy.221 The 1990 World Development Report
proposed that the poor be integrated into the labor force.222 Thus, at the center of the
CDF agenda is incorporating the poor into what is now the global capitalist system, by
putting them to work in the service of international capital.223 Throughout the 1990s, the
Bank promulgated a series of reports prescribing market friendly interventions such as
creating a competitive environment where private enterprises can flourish, integrating
into the global economy, and investing in people so that the populace might participate in
the market.224 In addition, governments were urged to define and protect property rights;
provide effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems; make available an efficient civil
service and protect the environment.225 Previous orthodoxies have been reversed, as the
need for import substitution and a strong state have been replaced by export-led growth
and a state that exists primarily to support private markets.226

Thus, the Comprehensive

Development Framework concretizes the new neo-liberal orthodoxy of markets and
democracy.
It is evident that the World Bank has sought to respond to some of its critics and
move beyond the macroeconomic failures of structural adjustment. The problem is that
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the Bank and other international financial institutions227 are only capable of modifying
their policies within the same discursive space. The Comprehensive Development
Framework demonstrates just how all-inclusive and wide-ranging interventions in the
Third World have become. Unfortunately, these economic programs have in reality
exacerbated inequality and poverty within the populations of many Third World
countries.228

III.

Legal Constructions of Development

As the cycles of conventional wisdom promulgated by international institutions
waxed and waned, the nations of the Third World began to take rather bold steps in the
international legal arena to obtain and solidify a legal right to development. While firmly
rooted in the belief that development was the ultimate objective, the movements that
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were quite strident attempts to take control of this
process and to transform the economic and political relationship between the North and
the South.229 As the lost development decade of the 1980s unfolded and these
movements collapsed, Third World states attempted to incorporate development into the
burgeoning rights discourse, and thus to explicitly claim comprehensive development as a
legal right. More recently this quest has ripened into the more radical demand for
reparations.230 These efforts in many ways mirror the larger evolution of the development
discourse, with the movement to establish a law of international development, countries
of the Third World seized the legal initiative to establish development as a legally
mandated imperative.
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The movement to establish a law of international development231 became the focal
point and the vehicle for a profound and historic political confrontation between the West
and the Third World. Although couched in legal terms, this confrontation was and
remains fundamentally ideological. 232 International law was an instrument that promoted
the interests of the North at the expense of the South. The South now sought to turn the
tables by using international law to re-order the international political and economic
sphere and to achieve the goal of development. 233 Coinciding with the rise of
dependency theory, which posed a more radical critique of the economic relationships
among the countries of the world,234 and more specifically “the persistent and indeed
widening inequalities between the societies of the South and the industrialized countries
of the West,”235 the law of development sought no less than a fundamental change in the
relationship between the West and the Third World. With the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) as their institutional forum,236 Third World
leaders declared that “more than foreign aid, what was needed for the Third World to
break out of the vicious circle of poverty was a change in the terms governing its
relationship with the industrial world”.237 Although largely rejected in the West, 238 the
international law of development has been championed in the Third World since the
1960s.239 It has been an avowedly activist movement from its inception,240 and in due
course, advocated a broad range of development-related programs.241 The opening
gambit, the movement and demand for permanent sovereignty over natural resources was
less wide-ranging than what was to follow, but was surely no less far-reaching.
A. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
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The movement for permanent sovereignty over natural resources (“PSNR”)
embodied and symbolized the conflict of economic interests between capital exporting
and capital importing nations.242 Control over the natural resources located in what we
now call the Third World was a principal impetus for European colonial conquest. As
colonialism ended, it was immediately clear to the leaders of newly independent nations
that control of those same resources would be the key to future economic viability.243
Natural resources were the “natural” starting point, and a boundary that developing
countries could point to as evidence of the absence of genuine equality in the community
of nations.244 Accordingly, newly independent states quickly sought to renegotiate or
void the extraordinarily inequitable arrangements that had been imposed upon them
during the colonial period, and to establish that the ultimate authority over natural
resources is vested in the nation-state where those resources are located.245
Although the movement for PSNR is typically associated with the debate
surrounding the December 14, 1962 passage of U.N. General Assembly Resolution
1803,246 in fact, it was underway a full decade earlier.247

Still, the 1962 Resolution and

surrounding debate are said by many commentators to reflect the most contentious
question of the new international economic order.248 A threshold legal question was
whether the inalienability of natural resources constituted a peremptory norm of
international law under the doctrine of jus cogens, or whether individual cases should be
resolved by balancing strict enforcement of contractual obligations under the doctrine of
pacta sunt servanda against relief based on changed circumstances under the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus.249 The concrete manifestation of this seemingly theoretical issue was
the enforceability or voidability of long-term concessions providing for the extraction of
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natural resources on terms extremely favorable to Western based transnational
corporations.250 Although these agreements should have been highly suspect based on
the circumstances under which they typically were negotiated, Third World governments
were having little success with individual challenges – a series of which were made in
arbitrations after World War II.251
Therefore, Third World countries sought, through the PSNR declaration, to
establish the right to expropriate foreign enterprises if they deemed it necessary to do
so.252 It was clear that resolutions according the right to nationalize were widely
supported and would be easily passed by the UN General Assembly, so Western interests
turned their energy and attention to the issue of compensation for expropriations. Western
states and interests contended that the relevant law was “well settled” – state
expropriation of foreign-owned property required payment of “prompt, adequate, and
effective” compensation under the “Hull formula”.253 Rejecting the unspoken premise
that foreign ownership was presumptively legitimate, and realizing that such a standard
would preclude nationalizations in many poor nations, Third World leaders contended
that the national tribunals of the host country, in accordance with national law, should
determine compensation.254 The standard, ultimately incorporated into U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 1803, requires “appropriate compensation.”255 This would appear
to reflect a compromise, but it has proved to be a victory for capital exporting nations
who have had the political and economic power to insist on the traditional (Western) Hull
formula.256 This constraint made nationalization too costly for many non-oil exporting
states.
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Nonetheless, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources has
been reiterated in subsequent resolutions and declarations, and clearly reflects at least a
Third World consensus not just on what the law should be – but on what the law is.257
Although PSNR ultimately proved to be a hollow victory, the PSNR movement and
General Assembly Resolution 1803 were important in establishing momentum for an
international law of development. This movement next appeared in the form of demands
for a New International Economic Order.
B. A New International Economic Order
In the early 1970s, the United Nations was again the forum for an exceedingly
contentious series of debates between Third World leaders and representatives of the
Western, capital exporting countries. Although the debates were again cast in legal
terms, the conflict remained fundamentally ideological, having to do with the
international distribution of power. The principles of the movement for a new
international economic order (“NIEO”) were embodied in a set of instruments passed by
the United Nations General Assembly. These instruments include the Declaration on the
Establishment of the New International Economic Order,258 the Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order259 and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States.260 The principles embodied in these documents
represent an expansion of the movement for permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, and continuation of the legal effort by Southern countries to find voice and to
exercise more power over their political and economic destinies.261 Relying on the
discourse of sovereignty and believing in both the power of international law and the
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importance of development, the NIEO movement asserted that full and permanent
sovereignty was not limited to natural resources, but applied to all economic activities.262
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1976,263 the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (“the Charter”) was the documentary centerpiece of this
phase of the movement.264 The NIEO agenda, as articulated in the Charter, included
subjecting private foreign capital to the domestic laws of Third World host countries, full
and effective participation in world governance, special trade preferences, stabilizing
export prices for commodities exported by Southern countries, debt forgiveness or
rescheduling, and technology transfer.265 The Charter also explicitly recognized the
sovereign right to nationalize foreign property and to determine what compensation
should be paid,266 and confirmed the right of host nation governments to supervise
transnational corporations operating within their jurisdictions.267 The Charter further
mandated that industrialized countries cooperate to improve living standards and the
general welfare in developing countries.268
Northern opposition to the NIEO generally and to the Charter in particular was
immediate, uniform and adamant.269 Technically, Northern countries objected to the
Charter’s alleged rejection of “established principles of international law” – principles
they contended were “neutral” and “universal.”270 Third World leaders and scholars,
however, contended (and still do) that international law was contrived in part to enable
and justify colonialism, and has been an instrument “for enhancing and aggravating
human suffering, not for alleviating it.”271 Yet even as the NIEO movement sought to
change legal principles, it also relied on law,272 seeking only to change its content and to
use it as a force for change. Given the overwhelming majorities that approved these
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declarations, Southern countries took the position that resolutions comprising the New
International Economic Order were legally binding on all nation states, but the West
disagreed and has never accepted them.273 Although Northern countries detailed their
objections to specific provisions of the Charter,274 it was unmistakable that the
disagreement was not merely technical. Rather, the NIEO movement brought into focus
a fundamental political conflict between the West and the Third World.275 The debt crisis
in the early 1980s was perhaps the final blow to the NIEO as many Third World
governments were now pleading for sufficient funds to stay afloat rather than demanding
economic and political concessions.276 Although the NIEO failed to produce the desired
redistribution of international economic power, the Third World has been persistent, and
many of the principles found in the New International Economic Order were soon
reformulated and reintroduced as the Right to Development.277
C. The Right to Development
In 1986, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development
(“UNDRD”),278 whose objective was to convert development from being merely a goal
or aspiration into an entitlement, both for countries and for their individual citizens.279
The movement for a right to development continued Third World demands for a more
equitable distribution of international power, but it did so in a less threatening and
strident manner than NIEO demands, perhaps reflecting the weakened position of Third
World countries in the wake of the debt crisis.280 The UNDRD also sought to expand the
definition of development to include technology, human rights, participation, equal
opportunity, accountability, and differential treatment for developing countries.281
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Development as a human right evolved in part from earlier assertions regarding
the law of development.282 It was first articulated by Senegalese Justice Keba M’Baye,283
who proclaimed that “development is the right of all men.”284 Justice M’Baye reasoned
that a human right to development was needed to rectify the injustices of an international
economic system in which the North benefits at the expense of the South.285 M’Baye
also maintained that basic principles of humanity support a right to development,286 he
observed an “inherent correlation between the enjoyment of human rights and economic
development,” believing that human rights could not be enjoyed without economic
development.287
However, those who expected the UNDRD to mark a turning point in
international economic relations have been sorely disappointed.288 While development as
a human right has been advocated by developing countries 289 it has been just as
vigorously opposed by those nations that would be obliged to render the substantial
material assistance necessary to effectuate the right, and by the international financial
institutions whose support and commitment would be needed to implement it. 290 To
acknowledge a right to development would mean conceding that there is an obligation to
provide foreign assistance and to take part in the development project. The West has
vehemently and consistently rejected legal obligations of this variety. The UNDRD has
not been an exception and, of course, there is no effective sanction for non-recognition of
the UNDRD.291
The UNDRD also clearly defines development as comprehensive. While earlier
international law of development efforts were framed as demands to modify the
international distribution of economic and political power, the right to development

Deconstructing Development – Gordon/Sylvester
Page 37 of 92
attempts to utilize the human rights framework. Perhaps this reflects the weaker position
of Third World countries by the 1980s, or it may signify an altered post Cold War
political landscape that has changed the nature of what can be claimed and the mode in
which those claims can be made. While Third World scholars and nations have continued
to assert the right to development, some have also harkened back to more radical
demands292 and have sought to hold industrialized countries to account by demanding
reparations.293
D. Reparations
If one accepts the proposition that the Third World has been severely and
systematically exploited through arrangements that include slavery and colonialism,294
then the idea of compensation for that harm should hardly be remarkable. 295 But calls for
reparations to the victims of slavery and colonialism have been extremely
controversial.296 Drawing on the vigorously debated movement in the U.S. for
reparations to the descendants of African slaves,297 the international struggle for
reparations has been contested in the United Nations and its associated institutions. The
latest skirmish was the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (the “Conference” or “WCAR”). 298 Preparations for
the Conference included four regional conferences and each Regional Conference
adopted reports addressing the most important issues to the region. 299 These Regional
Conferences revealed that the most important issues to many Third World countries
included the legacy of colonialism, slavery and the slave trade,300 matters that were not
priorities for Western nations.301

Indeed, the African regional Declaration focused
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primarily on injuries stemming from slavery and colonialism,302 and recommended
international compensation for its victims.303
Although later events diverted attention from the WCAR debate over
reparations,304 it was apparent that reparations were a clear priority for many nations of
the world.305 The Declaration ultimately adopted by the Conference concluded that
colonialism led to racism, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and that “the
effects and persistence of these structures and practices have been among the factors
contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world
today.”306 Nonetheless, the Programme of Action did not endorse reparations for those
countries that had been the victims of colonialism. Instead it acknowledged a “need to
develop programmes for the social and economic development of these societies and the
Diaspora, within the framework of a new partnership based on the spirit of solidarity and
mutual respect.”307
Many who supported reparations were very disappointed.308 Yet, the inability to
garner sufficient support for reparations is not surprising, nor is endorsement and
adoption of the alternative programs for economic and social development. To demand
reparations is to demand compensation that can be utilized as the payee sees fit. Harking
back to the more militant demands of the New International Order, reparations are a more
radical demand to return plundered assets, jurisdiction and authority to their rightful
possessors, the governments and peoples of the Third World. It would indeed be
surprising that an international community that views certain peoples as underdeveloped
and in need of developing into something else would adopt such a concept.309 Additional
programs, designed and implemented by international institutions, however, do fit within
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the current paradigm that defines the Third World. Thus putting the case for reparations
on the international public record is an act of historic significance – despite its rejection
by those countries and interests currently in power.310 Moreover, its overwhelming
rejection by the West and the endorsement in its stead of development says much about
development as discourse.
International law proved incapable of being a starting place for reordering the
international economic system and sharing economic and power with theThi rd World.
International law is based in part on shared interests,311 but it is also based on power and
that power resides with the industrialized world, and more particularly these days, with
the United States. Law has been used in the service of development and as a mechanism
to control the Third World, through such principles as prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. When Third World nations sought to use law as a source of strength and
power they were rebuffed and then simply ignored, as their proposals died a slow but
inevitable death. International law proved incapable of assisting the non-West, for its
purpose is to serve the West. In the era of globalization, international law will be an even
stronger part of the edifice that locks the Third World into chasing a future that is made
in the West through the discourse of Development

V. Deconstructing Development
‘Development is the process by which other peoples are “dominated, and
their destinies are shaped, according to an essentially Western way of
conceiving and perceiving the world; it is part of an imperial process
whereby other peoples are appropriated and turned into objects”.
Development is a fundamental part of the process ‘whereby the
developed countries manage, control and even create the Third World
economically, politically, sociologically and culturally’.312
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Development can be viewed as an idea, an objective or as an activity.313 Previous
parts of this article have discussed development within each of these contexts. This part
turns to deconstructing the development paradigm by interrogating development as
discourse314 and as ideology.315 Postmodernism’s considerations of difference and
discourse, and its challenge to the universalizing “truths” of enlightenment thinking,
greatly assist in appraising development in both theory and practice.316 Scholars have
drawn on this perspective to question whether development is synonymous with
westernization and modernization, and whether Western political, social and economic
institutions and practices (whether liberal or socialist) are the keys to solving the
problems of the Third World.317
A. Positioning Development in the Western Imagination
If development is a natural and universal process, and an inherent part of the
human condition, we can only critique its successes or failures – not the concept itself. It
often seems that development is indeed innate, for it is seldom contested in a fundamental
fashion and the reaction to those who raise such queries is often incredulity or outright
dismissal. Although it is shrouded by a discourse that portrays it as a universal and
invariably desirable process, development is actually a set of “practices and beliefs that
are woven into the fabric of Western culture and is specific to it.”318 Development is
neither an innate process, nor a trans-cultural concept that can claim universal validity. 319
Rather, many of the ideas embedded within the development paradigm, such as progress,
planning, poverty and modernization are firmly rooted within Western economic,
political and cultural thought.320
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The widespread acceptance of development as instinctive or natural has much to
do with the power of the West to construct the prism through which the world is
perceived. At the heart of this overwhelmingly dominant western world view321 is Eurocentrism – “the conscious or unconscious process by which Europe and Euro-American
assumptions are constructed as, or assumed to be, the normal, the natural or the
universal.”322 This perspective has become the near-exclusive organizing principle and
evaluative standard for humankind.323 The West not only influences and alters but, in
some ways, essentially produces other cultures.324 Indeed, much of the non-West now
uses the West, almost instinctively, as the standard for judging the worth of its
societies.325 Euro-centrism also organizes the system of thought known as
development.326 This is not to suggest that development is inherently flawed or invalid
because it emanates from the West.327 Rather, it is to submit that because development is
merely a particular system of thought, it is not impervious to fundamental challenge or
critique. The power of Euro-centrism makes this critique difficult,328 However, reduces
even development’s most serious critics to attacking it from within the boundaries of the
paradigm.329
Locating development within the Western imagination may seem to suggest that
the Third World is “a passive vessel for ideas that emanate from the West”.330 But neither
the West nor its ideas are a homogenous totality, and certainly the millions of people who
have been on the receiving end of development policies possess complex histories,
societies, politics, cultures and individual lives. They have responded to development in
countless ways, and development itself has changed and evolved, at times in reaction to
these multiple responses. Nonetheless, for the most part the development project
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continues to be shaped by Western elites and experts, who define its objects, theories and
practices.331 Its theoretical underpinnings can be found in enlightenment philosophy,332
and its veneer of universality and inevitability is part of the Eurocentrism that shapes
most contemporary worldviews, and simultaneously devalues and marginalizes the
knowledge of others.333 Development thus elevates and reinforces the power of the West,
as it controls and in essence creates the Third World.334
Development is rooted in an evolutionary myth that reduces history to a series of
formal stages.335 Although this myth is founded on the particular experiences of
European societies, the development paradigm regards these stages as universal and
applicable to all societies.336 It is the norm by which other social orders are judged,337
and all societies are presumed to transverse the same fixed and linear path.338 This linear
view of the past, present and future is necessarily imbued with hierarchy for the concept
of development suggests that:
There are nations that have embraced Western technology enough to be
developed; there are other nations on a lower scale of civilization that are
developing; and there are still other nations that, steeped in religion and
tradition, reject all forms of liberalism and secularism and thus remain
underdeveloped . . .339
Western industrialized nations are at the pinnacle of this edifice and the nations of
the Third World are necessarily subordinate to those at the apex. But development holds
out the prospect that, with the assistance of the “more advanced,” the underdeveloped
could catch up and also become modern and developed.340 These assumptions were a
natural extension of a colonial discourse that emphasized Third World cultural, political,
social and racial inferiority341 and justified itself, in part, by a paternalistic mission to
uplift and civilize the natives.342 While development is a postcolonial (if not a neo-
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colonial) discourse,343 it has strong colonial roots.344 Indeed, the transition from
colonialism to the development process may have been merely a shift in emphasis rather
than the end of one project and the beginning of another.345 The rhetoric of colonialism
re-emerged in the language of international development agencies through a discourse
that emphasized the vulnerability and helplessness of Third World peoples.346 The World
Bank sent “missions” to underdeveloped countries to formulate wide-ranging
development programs that would, in effect, bring salvation.347 There was now a moral
imperative to intervene,348 even as the power relationship that formerly existed between
the colonizer and the colonized continued.349 By the middle of the 20th century, those
whom Europeans had previously designated as “uncivilized” and “backward” now had a
new appellation: underdeveloped.350
B. Constructing the Underdeveloped
A critical aspect of the dominance of the West resides in its power to produce and
propagate knowledge and to thereby create categories such as the underdeveloped. 351
The West has been able to define and indeed to create the “Other” – objects to be studied,
described and developed,352 and that “Other” is invariably lacking, deficient, inferior,353
and in need of Western assistance.354 This power to define and represent others is
assumed “in the portrayal of ways in which people live their lives, in articulating their
experiences – and on this basis, in shaping the processes of change.”355 Peoples with
complex and varied histories, cultures and communities became homogenized masses
mired in intolerable poverty and in need of Western assistance.356 The objects of
development proliferated and included, inter alia, poverty, insufficient technology and
capital, rapid population growth, inadequate public services, and archaic agricultural
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practices; new problems were continually incorporated, categorized and further
defined.357 Indeed, the “vast surface over which the discourse effortlessly moved
eventually covered practically the entire cultural, economic and political geography of the
Third World.”358
Development problems were invariably framed in a manner that required Western
intervention and the input of “experts”,359 and it was the discourse of development that
determined who qualified as “expert.”360 Economists, demographers, educators,
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and specialists in agriculture, public health
and nutrition were enlisted to carry out the modernization project.361 Development
professionals were generally dispassionate academics and practitioners, who were usually
far removed from the experiences and lives in which they intervened.362 Locating
knowledge in specialists, however, privileges some voices and silences others.363 It also
means solutions emanate from foreign sources,364 while local knowledge and ways of
knowing and being are ignored, discarded or co-opted. 365 Overpowered by the
hegemonic discourse of the West, Third World societies often were effectively prevented
from articulating their own identities and worldviews. Many seem to have internalized
the perspectives of the modernizers and developers, a process facilitated by comprador
Third World intellectuals.366
The post war development discourse established a discursive practice that in turn
established the rules of the game.367 This discourse permits “the systematic creation of
objects, concepts and strategies,”368 as it determines who can speak, from what points of
view, and with what authority. It establishes the criteria that define expertise and that
expertise was deemed to reside in Western systems of thought, values and ways of life.
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Dominant strands of development theory and practice (including most “alternative”
theories) are constructed in the West and implemented in the Third World.369 Western
policy-makers decide which projects will be funded and where aid money will be spent or
withdrawn.370 Third World governments are granted ostensible authority over their
citizens, but rich countries and international lending institutions very often decide what
will actually be done in Third World countries.371 Thus, the hierarchical relationship that
once existed between the colonizer and the colonized continues.372
An example of how the problem and then the solution are constructed within the
development paradigm can be discerned in an oft-told depiction of Egypt. Popular
representations of Egypt invariably describe it as an overpopulated country, whose
population is crowded within a narrow strip of land in the Nile Valley, and is growing at
a rate that outpaces its ability to grow sufficient food.373 The obvious response to the
“natural limits of geography and demography” is technological and managerial
assistance, entailing the massive input of Western expertise and capital resources.374 Yet
substantial questions can be raised regarding the claim that Egypt has too many people,375
that it lacks the ability to grow sufficient food376 or that it possesses too little land.377 If
the problem is redefined as changing consumption patterns and access to land, then the
solutions also change and may encompass political and social constructs that are beyond
the reach of Western development experts.
This misrepresentation of Egypt does not merely give rise to ineffective policies.
Its simplistic and unchallenged premises378 show how Western-based development
institutions continue to present the countries and peoples of the Third World (such as
Egypt and its peoples) as objects of development, as something external to the expertise
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that is development, despite the tremendous involvement379 of these institutions in the
affairs of Third World nations and communities.380

VI. Conclusion: Envisioning a Post Development World
All developing countries are caught in a time warp of sorts,
where they can never really catch up with the West, …for the
West has become the past, present and future of the nonWest.381
Can development be transformed? What shape would a transformed development
paradigm take? If development turns out to be incapable of fundamental change, what
would the world look like without it? This part begins the process of thinking about these
questions and contemplating a world without development. If development depends on
shared beliefs rather than destiny, it is possible to at least askwhether Third World
societies must necessarily reproduce themselves according to Western notions of
development, or remain forever at the margins of the international community.382

Must

one develop or perish?383 We do not propose a substitute grand vision; our aim is to
challenge the narrative of development, not to replace it with another.
Development theory and practice are in a quandary. There is a gap between
academics and practitioners.384 Development thought and policy have been subjected to
the postmodern critique385 discussed in this article, and have broadened into diverse and
sometimes inconsistent theories and modes of analysis.386 These diverse perspectives are
partly in response to a pervasive disillusionment with the failures of development,387 and
partly in support of the rising voices of indigenous resistance to development.388 At its
most radical, anti-developmentalism urges abandoning “Western universalism or EuroAmericanism and calls for identifying other visions, other ways of knowing and being,
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and for recognition that development has been an illusion.”389 It suggests that by
challenging the central concepts that set boundaries on our thinking development can be
exposed and “rejected as degenerate, ecologically maladaptive, and an empty dream.”390
Somewhat less radically, there is the hope that exposing the ideology underlying
development might lead to transformative responses from development’s proponents and
practitioners.391
The institutions, experts and politicians involved in technical assistance, however,
view the concept of development as incontestable, even while conceding some of its
failures.392 Some proponents fear that if they criticize development, already inadequate
assistance could be terminated or diverted to other ends.393 Moreover, some development
projects have been beneficial394 and imposed relatively little negative impact.395 The
postmodern analysis has also been criticized as challenging the notion of collective action
and interests, and as making “even the possibility of international intervention in pursuit
of development illusory and reactionary”.396 Post developmentalism seems to encourage
disengagement, and the abrogation of any Western accountability for the current state of
affairs in Third World nations.397 It is believed to offer little to those who aspire to safe
drinking water, a roof that does not leak and other material goods most citizens of
industrialized countries take for granted.398 Post-development theorists are charged with
attempting “to reinvent a pre-colonial Eden that never existed and is no less violent in
scripting identity, than are identities constructed in the name of development”.399 Adding
to the complexity is the daunting task of considering a post development world in the
wake of fifty years of development that has left many individuals worse off400 and
countries mired in debt and enmeshed in a system that has in effect led to re-
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colonization.401 What is more, in an era of globalization, is it even possible to escape the
development paradigm?402 These critiques raise serious questions to which -- absent a
new meta-narrative -- there is no comprehensive “answer.” Instead, there may be a range
of inquiries that might help shift the entire approach to development and to the Third
World. 403 Our objective is to begin a paradigm shift that relocates the locus of control
and authority.
With this possibility in mind, consider a question. Is it possible the Third World
would have been better off without the official development assistance it has been
accorded since the 1950s, keeping in mind the successes and failures of development and
its impact on war, peace, government structures, sovereignty, debt and a host of other
issues? Professors Simon and Narman pose a simpler form of this question404 and of
course find it impossible to answer.405 Yet perhaps it is a question that nonetheless
should be asked, as the liberal consensus constructs globalization in a manner that
threatens to consign permanently the people of the Third World to do the work that
people in the West no longer want to do.406 The Western assumption is that material
wealth means personal contentment, and the middle classes and elites of the South seem
to have adopted this view.407 But perhaps this is not entirely the case for everyone. The
desirability of material wealth may vary for different peoples depending on their
particular values and mores, just as such needs and desires vary within the Western
world. Development is assumed to improve the lives of its targets, but who defines
“improvement”, and who determines priorities and the desirability of interventions in
pursuit of change. The answers to these multifaceted questions are even more complex
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after fifty years of development, during which a plethora of policies have rained down
upon a broad range of societies, cultures and peoples.
Consider a second question. Was everything in the previous “non-developed
world” really so terrible? Surely the pre-colonial world was not an idyllic paradise. And
is true that people did not have many of the goods that are now deemed necessities in the
west.408 But perhaps people were productive enough to produce what they needed, a
capacity that is sorely lacking today as many countries are barely able to feed their
people.409 Certainly, the pre-development world was affected to varying degrees by
colonialism, which had uneven and often destabilizing consequences for the colonized.410
Nonetheless it is important to ask how people viewed themselves and their communities
before the advent of development.411 Is it possible that a sense of inclusiveness,
cohesiveness, belief in local capabilities, and a perception of self-worth could
characterize communities -- even when those communities were what many today would
characterize as poor?412 This is not to champion or romanticize mythical “timeless
traditions.”413 Rather, it is to acknowledge that before development people were not
helpless, incompetent, inferior creatures in need of salvation from the West, but instead
were quite capable and diverse human beings organized into myriad, complex
communities. A post development paradigm must consider how local communities might
begin to regain the agency to identify and name ones own dreams, viewpoints and ways
of being.
This transformation must also interrogate how and why non-Western cultures and
systems of thought are treated as somehow inferior, if not unacceptable.414 This query is
really directed more to Western communities and their views of the non-Western
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“Other.” To return agency to the peoples of the Third World would mean abdicating the
power to name and define the problem, as well as the scope and content of the dialogue,
and the substance and scale of any solutions.415 It is undeniable that many in the
development industry are very intelligent people with good hearts and only the best of
intentions. They truly care about the work they are doing and the people they are trying
to assist. But it can be difficult to revise long held perspectives and perceptions,
especially when those perspectives are an integral part of the cultural milieu in which one
exists.416 Images of the Third World as deficient and inferior are inherent in the words
“underdeveloped,” “undeveloped,” and “developing.” This, of course, empowers the
developer. Moreover, even as one tries to escape the development prism, there is often a
nagging suspicion that without the West the peoples of the Third World really are
somewhat helpless and not quite up to the task regardless of how it is defined.417 When
coupled with the racism thatgenerally presumes the Other as not quite competent, it
becomes even more difficult to move beyond these beliefs.418 Yet the crucial question is
control over destinies, the importing and imposition of values, and who is given the
power to define?419 Besides its economic and technological might, the West has the
power to define.420 This power must be returned to the peoples of the Third World, who
must determine the narratives that are to govern their lives.
This necessarily raises questions as to who exactly are “the people”, and how to
go about determining what “they” want. It may be that “the people” are incapable of
being concretely defined, and that any attempt to do so risks essentializing broad and
diverse communities. No attempt is made here to do so. Moreover, no assumptions are
made about the extent or the manner in which peoples may want to engage or disengage
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from the West or the development project, nor as to how people define their basic needs
or how those needs should be met. Indeed, it is fully expected that many will completely
embrace the West and what it has to offer; that others may be more selective, finding
value in some facets and unsuitability in others; while still others will reject the West
across-the-board. Rather than making such determinations, the work to be done in the
West is to try to figure out ways to somehow create a space to let people determine these
things for themselves.
What separates this undertaking from alternative development approaches such as
participation,421 is a different attitude and perspective in the West. The struggle to make
this change begins with Western interrogation of the assumption of power over others,
and the usurpation of agency and voice. Those in the West who are concerned about
poor peoples in the Third World must begin to question the power presumed to reside in
self and in the West. At all points along the political spectrum, whatever the critique, the
power to change or improve the lives of Third World peoples is assumed to reside in the
West. This may not be true in the final analysis. But whether it is or not, giving up this
power may bring about a humility that permits a true exchange and a dialogue that does
not frame the questions, control the dialogue and assume the answers, for it entertains the
possibility that those answers may lie elsewhere.
Consider a third and final question? What if development had succeeded? What
if the governments, institutions and people charged with realizing the development
project had succeeded in fulfilling its many promises, and there had actually been
sufficient funds and resources to make development a reality and all so-called
underdeveloped countries were now on economic par with the industrialized countries?
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It is doubtful the planet could support a world in which everyone consumed as many
resources and generated as much waste as the industrialized world.422 Perhaps this
indicates that development as currently defined is not universally attainable,423 and
replicating western consumption patterns may not be a desirable goal due to its global
impact. This is not to say that the people of the Third World should not have access to
the material goods widely enjoyed in the West. The people who will be affected must
determine the desirability of those goods, and of adopting the lifestyle associated with a
consumer culture.424 It is only to say that perhaps modernization as it is currently
configured is ultimately unsustainable and the entire international community should
begin to re-think development in all of its manifestations.425
There is evidence to suggest that this transformation may already be taking place
on both the local and global levels. The rising voices confronting globalization raise one
set of challenges426 At the local level, the development paradigm is being contested and
transformed by “social movements that are characterized by social actors, as opposed to
structures; the promotion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics;
and a search, not for grand structural transformations but rather, for the construction of
identities and greater autonomy through modifications in everyday practices and
beliefs.”427 While certainly not a grand break with the past,428 these developments clearly
signal a new direction.429 It may be these local and particular movements that point us
towards a post-development world that is not tied to grand schemes and designs, but is
rooted in the diverse and the specific. In the face of globalization, which is presented as
inevitable, focusing on the local may seem parochial. But almost all global actors,
including multinational corporations, whose reach and power seems to be almost infinite,
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in fact operate locally. Products and services must be made and sold within localities and
it may be on the local level that such entities, and the notion of the global and universal,
can be most effectively questioned and, if necessary, challenged.430
Does this mean that there is no role for those in the West who wish to assist and
act in solidarity with those in the Third World who seem to be on the economic and
political periphery? On the contrary, there may be a number of ways to engage, although
the nature of that engagement may have to evolve. Documenting and sharing the local
encounters noted above can be of immense assistance for such information can not only
be encouraging and inspiring, but may help other communities in devising strategies and
tactics.431 Scholars, attorneys, economists and others might also engage Western
institutions on expunging the obscene debt that is draining many of the very poorest
countries.432 The debt did not exist in 1950 and has many roots, but surely it is tied to the
modernization project. This article does not address wars and other instances of extreme
dislocation that may require certain types of interventions be it from the West or other
Third World nations. Although the legality of such interventions is the subject of endless
debate,433 this may be another area in which concerned communities in the West can
assert positive influence.
There is certainly work to be done in shaping assistance when assistance is
desired, although it may be difficult to let go of deep-rooted assumptions and long-held
power. Without doubt, critically questioning the very concept of development is the first
step in fundamentally changing the manner in which one thinks about development and
its objects, and is the place to begin probing accepted wisdom about “the Other.” There
is little to suggest that the people whose lives have been dramatically changed by
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development necessarily refuse to accept change. What may be desired is change that
helps people enhance inborn and cultural capacities, and change that allows individuals to
blossom and leaves them free to change the rules and content of change, according to
their own ethics and aspirations.434 The objective it is to pose different questions, to hear
the responses of others, and to not assume that the answers reside in the West. It is to
slowly, but steadily and surely, accomplish a paradigm shift.
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Technical Assistance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 190 (Noting that just as the
Marshall Plan was to contain the communist threat in Europe, economic aid became part of American
political strategy. The Cold War thus animated and colored the development project, as anti-communist
credentials became a condition for assistance.).
31
Senarclens, supra note 30.
32
“At the end of the Second World War, the United States controlled approximately 70% of the world’s
gold and foreign exchange reserves and 40% of industrial output.” Kiely, supra note 7, at 26.
33
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 32 (noting that “1945 marked a profound transformation in world affairs” as
the United States assumed the “undisputable position of economic and military preeminence, placing under
its tutelage the entire Western system”).
34
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 28; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 13, at 1.
35
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23–24; Majid Rahnema, Poverty, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 161.
36
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23 (quoting Wolfgang Sachs, The Archaeology of the Development Idea,
23(4) INTERCULTURE 1–37 (1990)). The origins of standard of living and the projection of global poverty
are relatively new constructs that are “encased in development plans, foreign aid reports and national
accounts data building in part on the Keynesian revolution.” Watts, supra note 24, at 51.
37
Rahnema, supra note 35, at 161.
38
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23.
39
Senarclens, supra note 30.
40
Id. During the decades following the Second World War and throughout the decolonization era, the idea
of “convergence” – that the gap between the rich and the poor would shrink – dominated thinking about
development. There clearly has been no such convergence and the entire idea appears to have been
discarded. See generally Lant G. Pritchett, Forget Convergence: Divergence, Past, Present, and Future, 33
FIN. & DEV. 2 (1996); Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization, Convergence, and History, 56 J. ECON. HIST.
277 (1996). For example, during the last two decades, China and India have experienced faster income
growth than the world’s rich countries. Nonetheless, it would require another 100 years of growth at rates
higher than those of the U.S., for China and India to reach today’s level of average income in the U.S.
Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, 98 FOREIGN POL’Y 76 (1998).
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41

Rahnema, supra note 35, at 158 (detailing the many ways in which a variety of cultures define and
perceive poverty).
42
Id. at 159. See also Ivan Illich, Needs, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 88.
43
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24.
44
This assumption justified the basic tenets of intervention: poverty was too global and delicate a matter to
taken out of the hands of professionals and institutions that were trained and empowered for this purpose;
programs had to be charted in terms of economic resources and needs; and the agents that would be
primarily responsible for designing and executing such strategies would be governments and other
institutions. Rahnema, supra note 35, at 164. Professor Rahnema explains that anti-poverty programs
claim to be based on an assessment of needs, but that within the global context, needs are identified in an
abstract manner. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 163. Thus impoverished wage earners focused their struggles on limited objectives such as raising
income. Labor unions were utilized while informal and formal community organizations that had
traditionally assisted the poor were disregarded and ignored. Id.
47
Id.
48
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24.
49
Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163; Illich, supra note 42, at 88.
50
Nanda Shrestha, Becoming a Development Category, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 266.
Except where noted, this account of life in Nepal before and after development is from this fascinating
chapter by Professor Shrestha.
51
Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163.
52
Id.
53
Shrestha, supra note 50, at 266. Professor Shrestha notes how a road that had fallen into disrepair would
have been mended through the collective efforts of the village in the pre-development world. This sense of
collective action disappeared with the advent of development, as everyone waited for the developers to fix
it.
54
Ted Lewellen, Deconstructing Development: Toward an Anthropological Definition of a Value-Laden
Concept, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association at Washington, DC
(Nov. 1997) ( noting that “many currently ‘underdeveloped’ regions of the world were developing quite
well before their cultures were crushed or shifted in entirely new directions by Western expansion since the
16th Century”).
55
See, e.g., Ziauddin Sardar, Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT
THEORY, supra note 4, at 53; see also Richard Cameron Blake, The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive
Development Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 159, 166 (2000) (stating “as developing countries created ‘economic, political, and social institutions
similar to those in the West,’ economic development would inevitably result”); Aoki, supra note 3, at 927–
28.
56
OZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD: EUROCENTRICITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THEORIES 60 (2d ed. 1995) (noting traditional societies were viewed as exercising little control over their
environment, as “lacking the traits of modern persons, and as devoid of political consciousness or active
involvement in shaping their future.”)
57
Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 7. Professors Kothari and Minougue contend that successive
development theories have simply been reformulations of modernization theory, which they posit as the
mega theory of development. Id. at 7–8.
58
Sardar, supra note 55, at 52.
59
JAMES MITTELMAN & MUSTAPHA KAMAL PASHA, OUT FROM UNDERDEVELOPMENT REVISITED:
CHANGING GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND THE REMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 38 (1997).
60
Id. (paraphrasing W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(1960)).
61
In the early years, all parties seemed to focus on increasing foreign aid from industrialized countries. See
GABE S. VARGES, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER LEGAL DEBATE 3–4, 29 (1983). Adeoye
Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: an Overview, 33
INT’L L.Q. 208, 209 (1984) (Noting that “for the developing nations, the realization of their economic
backwardness and lack of progress in combating it led them, at first, to press for more foreign aid from the
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industrial countries.” The United Nations proclaimed the 1960s the “Development Decade” and
announced, “less developed countries were to be assisted in achieving five percent annual growth in
aggregate national income through expanded international trade and an annual flow of international
assistance and capital.”).
62
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 39; Sardar, supra note 55, at 52 (Noting one early indicator of
modernization was urbanization, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the populations of the
newly independent countries were based in rural areas. Other indicators included literacy and voting.
Based on these indicators, the only road to modernization was industrialization.).
63
Sardar, supra note 55, at 52. Professor Mittelman and Pasha illustrate the impact modernization theories
can have by recounting the experiences of farmers in a district in Tanzania. In this district, land is in short
supply and most farmers interplant bananas (the staple food) and coffee, because they do not have enough
acreage to plant them separately. The government’s agricultural extension officers, however, advised them
to plant coffee separately because bananas draw nitrogen and water from the soil and shade the coffee crop.
This advice is based on experiments performed in laboratories and benefits only a minority of wealthier
landowners who have enough land to segregate the crops and cultivate land under conditions similar to
those in the lab. Larger landowners are also likely to mingle with government experts, which facilitate the
kind of communication that leads to the adoption of such changes. Peasants resist the proposed innovations
because they are useless or harmful to them. Government officers then regard the peasants as traditional,
meaning irresponsible, stupid and lazy. The Modernization hypothesis is then invoked to justify supporting
the agents of change and to legitimize coercing those now termed traditional peasants. MITTELMAN &
PASHA, supra note 59, at 39.
64
For a critique of progress, see José María Sbert, Progress, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 192; Vincent Tucker, The Myth of Development: A Critique of a Eurocentric Discourse, in
CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY, supra note 4, at 4–5 (Noting that progress as a concept became preeminent during the French and English revolutions, as both nations set out to change the world and the
manner in which it was perceived. This worldview eventually came to be perceived as self-evident and
universally valid. The rights of man (albeit not all men or any women) were championed, science appeared
to be capable of capturing nature and it was a period exploration and experimentation. The new mission
was modernity for the entire world and progress came to be fashioned in evolutionary terms. It is forgotten
or omitted, however, that a belief in “progress” also justified colonialism and imperialism, and has
“legitimized” genocide, slavery, and a host of other atrocities.).
65
See VARGES, supra note 61, at 29.
66
DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 271; Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 8.
See supra notes 30, 55, 61 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of these institutions and their
role in the development project.
67
Undoubtedly, the relationship of law to development has been an ever-present but contested theme. See
discussion infra Part V for Third World efforts to use law as a tool for achieving and consolidating
international political and economic.
68
Modernization theory arose following WWII and was supported primarily by American scholars. Brian
Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 471 (1995)
(reviewing 2 LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., 1992); LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD
(Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993)).
69
Id. at 471 (stating that “[t]he law and development movement adopted the basic tenets of modernization
theory, adhering to the notion that evolutionary progress would ultimately result in legal ideals and
institutions similar to those in the West”).
70
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1071. Its earliest proponents
placed “extreme reliance on law as an agent of modernization and progress predicated on a study of the
ideal types of law and administration that could facilitate progress.” Lakshman Marasinghe, Law and
Development: A Jurisprudence for the Developing World, 8 DEV. EXPRESS 1, 2 (1998/1999).
71
Professor Tamanaha has summarized the law and development paradigm as follows:
1) society is made up of individuals who consent to the state for their own welfare; 2) the
state exercises control over individuals through law, and it is constrained by law; 3) laws
are designed to achieve social purposes and do not offer a special advantage to any
individual or groups within the society; 4) laws are applied equally to all citizens; 5)
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courts are the primary legal institution with the responsibility for defining and applying
the law; 6) adjudication is based upon a comprehensive body of authoritative rules and
doctrines, and judicial decisions are not subject to outside influence; and 7) legal actors
follow the restraining rules and most of the population has internalized the law, and
where there are violations of the rules enforcement action will guarantee conformity
Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 473 (paraphrasing Trubek, supra note 70, at 1071).
72
Trubek, supra note 70, at 1073. Development was assumed to involve an increase in man’s rational
capacity to control the world, and thus in his ability to improve his material well being. But “development”
offered more than increased rationality and material satisfaction; it also promised greater equality,
enhanced freedom, and fuller participation in the community. As an ideal, therefore, “development” held
the promise of a life that would be richer in all ways for all Third World people.
73
Blake, supra note 55, at 167.
74
Several factors contributed to the movement’s abrupt demise, including a sharp drop in funding by both
the public and private sectors in the United States. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the
Ford Foundation, for example, were major funding sources for academic and fieldwork in law and
development; their financial support declined sharply in the early mid-1970s. Some observers believe this
policy change reflected popular disillusionment and a general loss of faith in government and the viability
of overseas interventions – resulting significantly from the Viet Nam war and Watergate. See Maxwell O.
Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 167, 169 (1997).
75
Id.
76
Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
723, 727–28 (1980) (Discussing the two ways scholars reacted to the lack of success of these philosophies.
Some argued that their failure “was the inevitable consequence of the transition to capitalist development…
The other elaborated a radical critique, suggesting that capitalist development in the periphery would not
reproduce the historical capitalist path… The first approach is still followed by the majority of development
practitioners.”).
77
Id. at 731; see also Aoki, supra note 3, at 928.
78
Trubek, supra note 70, at 1081. Critics of the movement also observed that “the development equation
contain[ed] a heavy social element, for which law is not the complete answer.” Marasinghe, supra note 70,
at 2. Of course, modernization has continually reappeared in different guises. See supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text.
79
For example, the intersection of law and economic development in the Third World continues to generate
significant attention – as evidenced by a 1992 book with precisely that title. The book was edited by P.
Ebow Bondzi-Simpson who, in the opening chapter, asserts that:
Law may be used to promote development as an institutional enterprise, providing a
framework for procedures to be adopted, mechanisms for the settlement of disputes
and/or agencies to monitor or review programs taken in pursuit of development. As a
normative device, law may provide a catalog of substantive rights, obligations and
entitlements. In either respect, law may be used to promote desired action or to curb or
regulate undesired actions or consequences.
P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson, Confronting the Dilemmas of Development Through Law, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 6 (P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson ed., 1992).
80
Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a NewParadigm for Law and Development,
108 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15 (1998) (noting that the overwhelming majority of development literature still
“urge[s] the rapid and full-blown liberalization and marketization of developing world economies”); id. at
17–18 (listing the many organizations that follow an agenda which promotes marketization and
democratization). Professor Maxwell Chuibundu notes:
Now that the globe seems to be marching to one drum beat, that of the free enterprise
capitalist system, it follows that the legal institutions and practices that have fostered and
sustained the triumph of the capitalist mode of production, accumulation, distribution,
and consumption are best suited for other societies, appropriately modified at the margins
to account for the peculiar foibles of those societies.
Chibundu, supra note 74, at 222.
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81

James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political
Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL.
L. REV. 971, 1000 (2000).
82
In a 1989 report the World Bank identified bad government (including poor policies, incompetence and
corruption) as the primary obstacle to economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. See WORLD BANK,
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY
(1989).
83
Chibundu, supra note 74, at 190–91.
84
Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin, 31 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 1317 (2000); Anthony Galano III, International Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt
Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 323 (1994); JACQUES J. POLAK & CATHERINE GWIN, THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP (1994). International Financial
Institutions or IFIs increasingly embrace an ever-widening array of governmental functions, such as
judicial and public service reorganization, government auditing functions, and labor and environmental
concerns. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 266 (2000) [hereinafter Anghie, Time
Present and Time Past] (noting World Bank interference in any activity that involves development); see
also James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter-Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999) [hereinafter
Gathii, Good Governance].
85
One means is through “conditionality” – the IFI practice of making loans conditional on policy and/or
structural changes by the borrowing state Conditionality allows the World Bank and the IMF to restrict
credit if a country’s fails to comply with the terms of its lending agreement. Tsai, supra note 84; POLAK &
GWIN, supra note 84. See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
86
The World Bank and the IMF are also known as the Bretton Woods institutions, because they were
formed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944. The two organizations have similar governance
structures, operating according to a weighted voting system that is based on contributions made by
members. The broad legal framework for the two institutions is also similar, with emphasis on an
ostensibly non-political character. See Anghie, supra note 84, at 269; Gathii, Good Governance, supra note
84, at 225.
87
Cf. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the
Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 529, 530 (2000) [hereinafter Rajagopal, From
Resistance to Renewal]. Professor Rajagopal rejects the prevailing “functionalist” conception of
international institutions. He notes that the functionalist “theory explains the emergence of international
institutions as a result of a pragmatic necessity to serve concrete functions… The central proposition of this
theory is that institutions are born and expand due to top-down policy decisions that correlate with the
functional needs of international society.” Not coincidentally, this top-down conception is consistent with
the “hegemonic nature of international law as an elitist discipline.”
88
Section I of Article I of IBRD’s Articles of Agreement states that the Bank is:
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating
the investment of capital for productive purpose, including the restoration of economies
destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime
needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in
less developed countries.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, art. I, §1, 60 Stat. 1440, 16
U.S.T. 1942, as amended (1945), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049557~menuPK:63
000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited on Feb. 22, 2004).
89
John D. Ciorciari, A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in
International Peace Operations, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 292, 298–99 (1998).
90
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. I, §
1.
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See Ciorciari, supra note 89, at 298–99; Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1989, 1991 (1994).
92
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, supra no
te 88, at art. III,
§ 5(b).
93
Id.
94
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 438 (“Indeed, it was commonplace in
development thinking in the late 1950s and early 1960s that poor countries would succumb to Communism
if they were not rescued from poverty.” Initially the Bank employed direct “Project lending” to support
anti-communist regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, Nicaragua, whose ruling Samoza
family was cooperating closely with the U.S. military, received 10 World Bank loans between 1951 and
1960. Guatemala, however, with three times Nicaragua’s population, received no World Bank support
until the overthrow of its supposedly communist regime in 1955. Loans were used to build dams, highways
and other infra-structure projects that would facilitate economic growth. As these projects failed to achieve
their intended results, however, it became apparent that securing the allegiance of Third World regimes –
particularly oppressive ones – would not necessarily pacify the populations who were subject to those
regimes, and thus there might be a need for direct programs to alleviate poverty. In other words, preventing
communist subversion in the Third World was going to require programs to alleviate poverty within Third
World countries, and this was not being accomplished by the World Bank’s project-based lending in
support of infrastructure and the required shift in policy began at the regional level.)
95
In 1959, U.S. President Eisenhower explained the establishment of the Inter-American Development
Bank as follows:
Traditional unilateral aid was sustaining a prevailing social order, which was unjust to the
masses of the people, but we could do nothing directly about this without violating the
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. The creation of the new
bank changed this, for now the Americas had a multinational instrument, secure against
control by any one country, for bettering the life of people throughout the Americas; if
this instrument insisted upon social reform as a condition of extending development
credit, it could scarcely be charged with “intervention.”
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1956-61: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 516 (1965), quoted in 1
DEVESH KAPUR, supra note 30, at at 155. Thus was established the regional mechanism for development
assistance conditioned on specific internal reforms by the country receiving the assistance.
96
The establishment of the IDA was the most significant institutional factor in the World Bank’s shift away
from project-lending based on traditional financial criteria and toward investing in “human capital” and
poverty reduction programs in the Third World. It was the model for multilateral institutions that would
have the credibility to insist on internal changes without charging individual nations with violating the
international principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. The same mechanism and
rationale were implemented without the regional limitation when the International Development
Association (IDA) was established as a part of the World Bank in 1961. Rajagopal, From Resistance to
Renewal, supra note 87, at 552.
97
See infra notes 112, 143 and accompanying text for discussion in the cycles of conventional wisdom.
98
The principal task originally assigned to the IMF was “to promote international monetary cooperation”
and “to give confidence to members by making the Fund’s resources temporarily available to them under
adequate safeguards.” Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I(i), I(v), 60 Stat.
1401, 29 U.S.T. 2203, as amended (1945), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; see also Enrique R. Carrasco, Income
Distribution and the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social
Development, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996); Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the
IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996); Stephen Anthony, IMF
Structural Adjustment Programs: An Economic Evaluation, 3 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 133 (1998).
99
Carreau, supra note 91 (Noting that in essence, the IMF’s member states agreed to relinquish some of
their sovereignty over their national monetary systems in exchange for short-term assistance when needed,
and for the stability the IMF would bring to the international monetary system. The IMF’s normative
powers thus depended on the cooperation of its member states.).
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100

Id. (also noting that this decision may have been in violation of the par value system established in the
IMF Articles of Agreement).
101
Id.
102
Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47.
103
Carreau, supra note 91 (noting that IMF lending has always been conditional; borrowers are required to
adopt stabilization plans and to correct the types of imbalances that were that thought to have figured
significantly in precipitating World War II).
104
Professor Carreau observes:
Gradually and involuntarily, the IMF has lost its influence over its most developed
member states, which remain bound by very limited monetary obligations since the
collapse of the par value system in 1971 and which have abstained from turning to the
IMF for assistance… because of the conditions imposed.
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997.
105
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 570.
106
For example, the IMF now recognizes economic growth as an objective – even though economic growth
was not one of its original purposes and is still not mentioned in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.
JACQUES J. POLAK, 184 THE CHANGING NATURE OF IMF CONDITIONALITY, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE, at 1, 17 (1991). It defines desirable economic growth as “high quality growth rather than flash in
the pan growth fueled by inflation and excessive borrowing, or growth at the expense of the poor, of the
environment, or growth run by the state.” IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus, quoted in id., at
19. This model of economic growth is quite compatible with the World Bank’s theory of economic
development. Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 573. Professor Carreau notes:
The IMF’s role seems limited to controlling the economies of member states requesting
financial assistance, namely developing countries and former command economy
countries that have no alternative sources of outside financing… Its assistance, originally
limited to financing short-term difficulties, has been completely modified to address
long-term, structural imbalances. And this is precisely the World Bank’s mission.
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997–98.
107
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 541.
108
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank’s Internal
Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197 (2001).
109
Liberal critics generally accept the candor and validity of IFI goals of alleviating poverty and improving
standards of living in the Third World. See Operational Directive 4.15: Poverty Reduction (1992), THE
WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL 2 (1992) (stating that “sustainable poverty reduction is the Bank’s
overarching objective”); Policy Development and Review Department, The Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) – Operational Issues, International Monetary Fund, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004) (proclaiming “poverty
reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit element of a renewed growthoriented economic strategy” of the IMF). In their view the problem is ineffective strategies and/or
improper implementation by IFIs themselves and/or by Third World governments. Some liberal critics also
allege that IFIs are “out of touch” because they are Western-dominated and unrepresentative). See, e.g.,
Oscar Shachter, The Evolving Law of International Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1976).
110
Critics embracing a more radical perspective contend that IFIs are in place primarily to maintain the
international economic status quo, and to enable the countries of the industrialized North to continue
exploiting the countries of the South. See, e.g., Saving Failed States, supra note 12; David Greenberg, Law
and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 129, 152 (1980); James Thuo
Gathii,Af rica’s Economic and Political Predicaments, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 1002 [hereinafter Gathii,
Africa Predicaments]; Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 224 (relating the hierarchical nature of
the international order and demonstrating that decisions to undertake national economic management have
been taken out of the hands of developing countries through structural adjustment programs that are
required for the continuance of foreign aid). Critics also point out that eighty percent of U.S. aid to Africa,
for example, is spent on American commodities, expertise, and subcontractors; only twenty percent of the
money ever leaves the U.S. It is also noteworthy that in 1989, the Bank employed 80,000 consultants on
Africa with only one percent of them being African, meaning the other ninety-nine percent come from
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outside the continent. Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, Remark, Panel Three: The Role of Multi-Lateral
Institutions in African Development, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 708, 711 (1999).
111
For example, Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal contends that both the liberal and radical critiques are
useful but flawed. He believes that the liberal critique (1) fails to acknowledge that IFI interventions in the
Third World often worsen circumstances by exacerbating class divisions that are already too broad, and (2)
is inadequate to explain not only the general failure of IFI poverty reduction programs, but also the
widespread popular resistance to those programs in the Third World. He believes the radical critique, on
the other hand, oversimplifies complex and differing relationships, leads to “policy paralysis, and fails to
explain the continuing participation of legions of intelligent and genuinely well-intentioned individuals in
“development work.” Professor Rajagopal suggests an alternative analysis that differs from the liberal and
radical critiques. He maintains that just as the Third World is defined by the concept of development, IFIs
are defined by their mission, and the development project has become that mission. He continues:
IFIs have had a complex relationship with Third World resistance. …it is the process by
which [IFIs] have dealt with that resistance, and not so much the resistance itself, that
have revealed the centrality of the resistance to the formation of the [IFIs’] changing
institutional agendas…. This … is hardly acknowledged by the [IFIs], who see their
evolution as being governed purely by the laws of economics, finance, or their Articles of
Agreement. It matters less that poverty alleviation programs never alleviate poverty or
that conditionalities never achieve their stated goals. Rather, these specific interventions
… redound to the authority and expansion of international institutions.
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 576.
112
The phrase “cycles of conventional wisdom” is borrowed from an article by economist Paul Krugman
that discusses the myriad models of development promulgated by development specialists and how these
models were developed. He concludes that development specialists are a closed insular group that does not
rely upon proven methods or past experience, and appear unable to accomplish modernization. Paul
Krugman, Cycles of Conventional Wisdom in Eocnomic Development, 72 INT’L AFFAIRS 717, 717 (1996).
113
Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 1. Definitions of “development” abound. Professor Simon asserts
that these definitions are “contextual and contingent upon the ideological, epistemological or
methodological orientation of their purveyors, and there has never been a consensus or unanimity about the
meaning or content of development.” Simon, supra note 10, at 17.
114
Autonomous decision-making and implementation by both nations and peoples were emphasized.
Sardar, supra note 55. See also Rosemary McGee, Participating in Development, in DEVELOPMENT
THEORY AND PRACTICE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 92.
115
Finite resources and the fragility of the global environment were additional factors to be considered and
taken into account. Sardar, supra note 55, at 53. This followed on the heals of the Stockholm Conference
on the Environment in 1972 and was popularized by such publications as WORLD COMMISSION ON
EMPLOYMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
116
“Liberalization” and “open markets” have become the driving force of development. Sardar, supra note
55.
117
Cowen & Shenton, supra note 17, at 27.
118
The so-called “golden age of development” overlapped with the beginning of what would be series of
United Nations Development Decades. Pursuant to a request by President John F. Kennedy, the General
Assembly of the United Nations unanimously approved Resolution 1710, which declared the first
Development Decade in 1961. The goal was to attain, “in each under-developed country a substantial
increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a minimum
annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 percent at the end of the Decade.” G.A. Res. 1710,
U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1084th plen. mtg., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); DUSAN DJONOVICH, 1
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1972). In some
respects, these resolutions reflect the failures of development, the hopes of Third World nations, and
convey the progression of development in theory and practice.
119
MEHMET, supra note 56, at 63.
120
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24 (stating development theory was strongly influenced by the neoKeynesian consensus that dominated economic thinking and practice in the post-War period); Paul
Cammack, Neoliberalism, the World Bank and the New Politics of Development, in DEVELOPMENT
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THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 157, 161 (noting that it was assumed that states could and should
intervene directly in production and distribution, making development an active, state-led process).
121
Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60.
122
MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. This is quite ironic given the contemporary near-religious devotion to
the free market.
123
Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60.
124
MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. Planners did not consider how countries would administer these
ambitious plans; indeed institution building was ignored and Western planners utilized a “how to do”
approach. Id.
125
Because underdeveloped countries were believed to be “trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and thus
lacking capital, it would therefore have to come from abroad.” ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40.
126
“Project lending” was aimed primarily at developing infrastructure; it was intended to facilitate business
by cultivating the factors necessary for economic growth. Bank officials believed it was crucial to
construct electric power plants and roads because industry could not be developed without electricity and
the means to transport finished products. Thus in the absence of this kind of infrastructure, most economic
activities would be difficult if not impossible. For example, good roads were necessary because no investor
would want to invest in a country if its products could not be transported. Sandra Blanco, Symposium: Part
One: Pursuing the Good Life: The meaning of Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, 9
TRANSNAT’L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (1999). Consequently, the Bank mainly financed dams,
highways, and other large-scale infrastructure projects. Tsai, supra note 84.
127
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 36(noting that technology not only “amplified material progress, [but]
would confer … a sense of direction and significance”; it was the key to modernization and indeed the
transfer of technology became an important component of the development project).
128
Id.
129
MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96. Institutional efficiency, indigenous history and culture and critical issues
such as land reform were not part of the planning process, plans were generally derived in a vacuum. Id.
130
Blanco, supra note 126, at 111.
131
Id.
132
Esteva, supra note 1, at 13.
133
See discussion infra Part II.A.
134
The multiplying failures of the development project and other events supported the dependency critique.
For example, when internal forces extended state control over the economy through nationalizations, and
sought to give workers and farmers more of a share in national wealth, private investors would flee and
foreign loans would be denied. This financial strangulation sometimes led to military coups and military
incursions into the political process. The repetition of this course of events fueled radical intellectuals who
emphasized the impact of imperialism which used political, military and economic dominance to control
production in foreign nations. They also emphasized the impact of external forces from the economies of
the “center” on the economies of the “periphery”, and focused on domination and subordination in general,
and specifically on the effects of imperialism and colonialism. MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at
44–45.
135
See discussion infra Part II.A.
136
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40.
137
Senarclens, supra note 30.
138
Blanco, supra note 126, at 111.
139
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999.
140
This was also arguably a violation of its Articles of Agreement. The World Bank Articles of Agreement
provide that the World Bank’s lending policy is to be dictated by purely financial considerations, meaning
its funds can be lent only on projects that are reasonably expected to generate sufficient funds to repay the
loan. Although it was believed these projects would contribute to the overall development of member
States, these projects could not be viewed as profit-oriented. Indeed, many of these projects did not
generate any income whatsoever. Thus, the Bank increased its financial exposure, and borrowing members
had to utilize already limited foreign exchange resources to repay the Bank. Not surprisingly, the Bank
began to face defaults. Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999.
141
Jennifer N. Weidner, World Bank Study, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193 (2001).
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142

In 1970, the UN General Assembly declared the beginning of a Second Development Decade (19711981) that called for a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, growth in primary education,
prevention and treatment of disease, and improved nutrition and housing. It also called for adjustments in
trade policies and for economically advantaged countries to support the development endeavors of
developing countries. EDMUND OZMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 528 (Anthony Mango ed., 2003). See also G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., 1912th plen. mtg., at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8124 and /Add.1 (1970).
143
Esteva, supra note 1, at 13–14. As early as 1962 ECOSOC had recommended that the economic and
social aspects of development be integrated. Proposals for Action of the First UN Development Decade
(1960-70), declared that “development is growth plus change…. Change is social and cultural as well as
economic, and qualitative as well as quantitative… The key concept must be improved quality of peoples’
lives. Nonetheless, development continued to be perceived as a “definable path of economic growth
passing through various stages, and “integration” simply linked the social aspect to the economic aspect.
Solon L. Barraclough, In Quest of Sustainable Development (unpublished paper, UNRISD).
144
Development was in reality more likely to worsen levels of absolute poverty for a large segment of the
population.
145
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 92.
146
See discussion supra Part III.A1.
147
Esteva, supra note 1, at 15. It also dovetailed with the World Bank strategy of targeting groups such as
the rural poor and small farmers.
148
See infra notes 142–43, 147 and accompanying text. This coincided with the end of Robert McNamara’s
tenure as President of the World Bank.
149
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 92.
152
For example, “Micro-development” theorists advocated targeting the individual rather than
infrastructure and governments, on the premise that development would occur when people were
empowered to confront and address their poverty. Once empowered, people would “organize themselves
and overcome the obstacles to their social, cultural and economic well-being” with foreign organizations
relegated to a supportive role. Empirically, micro-development theory assumes that poverty results from
lack [of] access to resources that are essential to the satisfaction of basic human needs,” and that this lack
of access is a ‘product of lack of power in social relations.’” See Blake, supra note 55, at 166. Microdevelopment theorists also emphasize a more equitable distribution of international economic power, which
can occur only at the macro level. Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right:
Results of the Global Consultation, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 322, 327 (1991).
153
Endogenous development proposed that the distinctiveness of individual cultures and societies should be
at the center of determining the goals to be pursued. This approach was generally accepted for a period of
time, even though it was at odds with core assumptions of the development project, which are
universalistic. Esteva, supra note 1, at 15.
154
Sustainable development was defined as economic growth that takes account of environmental concerns.
See David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 334, 334
(1997). Like micro-development, it had a social dimension, emphasizing that development is more than
economic growth. See also Blake, supra note 55, at 168; Forsythe, supra note 154, at 335. Both microdevelopment and sustainable development concentrate on education and literacy, health services, poverty
alleviation, environmental protection, community cooperation and participation, and social and cultural
cohesiveness; success is not measured solely in terms of economic growth. Results can be intangible, such
as improved skills in communication, leadership or management; a stronger sense of self; the establishment
of civil liberties; or the increased ability to leverage services from the state. Results can also be tangible,
such as increases in the production of agricultural or manufactured goods; a rise in family incomes; a
building used for organizational activities; or a road or water system. Id. at 166–68. The Stockholm
conference on the environment was in 1972, and the notion of sustainable development was further defined
and cemented with the publication of the Brandt Report, entitled Our Common Future.
155
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 93. The problem was that neither theorists nor NGOs bothered
with the endogenous cultures from which successful grassroots institutions might emerge. Id. See also
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McGee, supra note 114, at 92; Majid Rahnema, Participation, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 116 [hereinafter Rahnema, Participation].
156
“The complex relation between one particular problem and the other problems would be established and
then unified with the problem currently at the center of the process”. Esteva, Development, in THE
DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY at 14.
157
Wolfgang Sachs, Environment, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that
the ebb and flow of international development theories generally follow political sensibilities in the West).
For a discussion of the emergence of “basic needs” as a development strategy, see Arturo Escobar,
Planning, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 17, at 137–39 [hereinafter Escobar, Planning];
see also Illich, supra note 42, at 88–101.
158
Sachs, supra note 157, at 26.
159
McGee, supra note 114, at 92; Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116.
160
See Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87.
161
For an analysis of participation, see Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116. The emergence of these
paradigms may also reflect the influence of NGOS. McGee, supra note 114, at 92.
162
On December 5, 1980, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 35/36 that established the need
for a Third Development Decade for the 1980s. It called for accelerating development, promoting
economic and social development, reducing disparities between Northern and Southern tier countries, and
early eradication of poverty and dependency. The definitive objective was the “constant improvement of
the well being of the entire population through full participation in the process of development and the fair
distribution of benefits to women.” G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., at 106, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/35/36 (1980). Part of the strategy included establishing a new international economic order,
which would include industrialization and a more stable, equitable and effective international monetary
system. OZMANCZYK, supra note 142, at 528.
163
See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
164
The crushing burden of this debt continues to cement the dependent status of the poorest countries in the
international financial system. The combined total external debt of the Third World now exceeds two
trillion dollars. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999,
at 196 (1999). The legion and, thus far, unsuccessful proposals for resolving the crisis have included the
“Baker plan”; the “Brady plan”; “debt-for-equity,” “debt-for-nature,” and “debt-for-development” plans;
“securitization”; and the “Miyazawa,” “Mitterand,” and “Robinson” proposals. Sylvester, supra note 6, at
265–76. The program currently in effect is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) Debt Initiative.
HIPC was launched by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996, and then revised in 1999. Assistance
provided by HIPC is in addition to such relief as a debtor country may be able to arrange directly with
creditors. The World Bank’s web site outlines the initiative as follows:
Eligible countries will qualify for debt relief in two stages. In the first stage the debtor
country will need to demonstrate the capacity to use prudently the assistance granted by
establishing a satisfactory track record, normally of three years... In the second stage …
the country will implement a full-fledged poverty reduction strategy, which has been
prepared with broad participation of civil society, and an agreed set of measures aimed at
enhancing economic growth.
The World Bank Group, Ethiopia Receives Debt Relief Under HIPC Initiative: Total Support Worth
US$1.9 Billion, at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about background.html (last visited July 13, 2003). The
program now involves 42 countries: 34 in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and one in the
Middle East. The World Bank Group, HIPC, HIPC Map, at
http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/map/map.html (last visited July 13, 2003). The results of the HIPC
Initiative remain to be seen. Its implementation to date, however, has been no less top-down and inflexible
than previous IFI programs, according to participating country government officials with whom one of the
present authors has spoken. Professor Thomas observes that, “[t]he debt burden is directly related to world
hunger and poverty because debtor governments must divert precious and scarce resources to paying down
external debt instead of meeting the pressing needs of their populations.” Chantal Thomas, International
Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1712 (2000). Many Third
World governments spend more than twice as much servicing external debt as they do on health and
education. See Oxfam International Advocacy Offce & UNICEF, Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction:
Meeting the Challenge, § 2.1 (1999), available at
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http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp9908_debt_relief_and_poverty_reduction.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2004). “In Zambia – where infant mortality rates are increasing, over half a million children are out of
school, and illiteracy is rising – debt servicing claims more of the national budget that health and education
combined.” Id., at § 3.2 (emphasis omitted).
165
Jerome I. Levinson, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 489 (1989).
166
Oil prices, which had increased five-fold between 1971 and 1974, doubled again in 1980. Id. at 491,
495–96.
167
By 1974, OPEC annual revenues exceeded $100 billion. Sylvester, supra note 6, at 264. The
precariousness of the situation was compounded by political instability in Middle East, the 1979 fall of the
Shah of Iran, and double digit inflation in the United States. Id.
168
Id. at 265 (Noting that these developments affected Third World debtors in two critical ways. First, a
significant portion of the loans carried floating interest rates, and these rates skyrocketed. Second, because
of tight money and weakened demand, third world debtors had trouble selling their exports to raise
revenue. In 1982, Mexico made its historic declaration of inability to meet even the interest payments on
its external debts, and the “third world debt crisis” was well on its way to becoming a household phrase.)
169
Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161 (1998);
Anthony, supra note 98. Adjustment lending consisted of six core objectives. These were: “[1] raising
saving rates, [2] securing financial stability, [3] liberalizing and opening economies to foreign trade, [4]
reducing state intervention and making markets more efficient, [5] reorienting government spending and
improving revenue collection, and [6] mobilizing external sources.” IMF Development and Review
Department, Experience Under the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, FIN. & DEV., Sept.
1997, at 32, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/imf.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2003).
170
Swaminathan, supra note 169; Bradlow, supra note 98; Anthony, supra note 98. Organization of
Economic Development members and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand
could bypass the IMF and its constraints. Carreau, supra note 91, at 1996.
171
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 178–79; Bradlow, supra note 98. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement
explicitly prohibits any consideration of a nation’s political affairs in making loan determinations
Bradlow. Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997. Indeed, the IMF was to only be concerned with attaining
specifically prescribed macroeconomic goals, rather than with how a Member State actually reached those
goals. Although conditions were always attached to IMF lending, they were limited to macro-economic
variables such as debt, money supply, and inflation. Id. But with its involvement in the Third World, these
constraints began to dissolve, as the Fund’s primary role shifted to handling the economies of developing
countries and more recently countries in transition. Moreover, stabilization programs sponsored and
approved by the Fund are ‘a seal of international approval of a State’s economic policies that acts as a de
facto guarantee for prospective private lenders. Id.
172
Id. at 1999. Loans were made for adjustment in given sectors (sector adjustment) or for national
economies as a whole (structural adjustment).
173
Tsai, supra note 84, at 1331–32; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 169–70; Weidner, supra note 141, at
200.
174
The Bank, of course, determined which policies were “appropriate” – and it did so against the backdrop
of the “cold war” between the West and the Soviet bloc. Weidner, supra note 141.
175
Initially, the Bank developed two types of policy-based loans for the Third World. The first of these was
termed a “structural adjustment loan,” or SAL. SALs generally run eight to ten years and require the
borrowing country to conform to certain Bank guidelines regarding economic policies. The stated
objectives of SALs are: “(1) correcting balance of payments imbalances, (2) eliminating distortions and
promoting microeconomic efficiency, (3) reducing high inflation rates, (4) protecting or resuming output
growth, and (5) minimizing the cost of adjustment to the poorest” segments of the population. The second
type of policy-based lending is “sector adjustment loans,” or SECALs. SECALs are similar to SALs in that
both are conditioned on implementing policy-based initiatives. SECALs, however, are generally more
narrowly defined, and specific sectors of the economy are targeted for fiscal reform. Usually the focus is
on exports, agriculture, industry, energy, and public enterprises. SALs and SECALS are both referred to as
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) because they promote economic liberalization by forcing nations to
address inequity in their fiscal policies. Carrasco, supra note 98, at 29; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1320–21; 3
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THE WORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL SCALE, RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS 11 (Jo Marie
Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1996).
176
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999.
177
Bradlow, supra note 98, at 38–39; Uriz, supra note 108, at 203–04.
178
See infra Part II.B.3 for discussion of the magnitude and significance of Third World debt.
179
Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38–39; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57.
180
The bank turned to alleviating Third World poverty by promoting economic growth.
181
IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 98, art. 4(1); Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57.
182
Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57 (noting that in the 1980s, the Bank became heavily involved in funding
development projects in such spheres as health, education, agriculture and housing).
183
See supra note 176–77;Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47, 54.
184
Weidner, supra note 141, at 198–99; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 60.
185
See Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57; Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Weidner, supra note 141, at 198–99.
186
Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38–39; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322.
187
The “seal of approval” earned by complying with World Bank and IMF credit packages was critical to
attaining private loans from the commercial banks of developed countries. See Tsai, supra note 84, at
1322; Galano III, supra note 84, at 339; Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary
Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 445 (1997).
188
Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322.
189
3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 134; George B.N. Ayittey, Aid for Black Elephants: How
Foreign Assistance Has Failed Africa, in PERPETUATING POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 115–16, 140–42 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vásquez eds., 1994).
190
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 177–89.
191
See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53 (commenting on adverse effects of
IFI structural adjustment programs in the Third World.). Somalia and Rwanda are two examples of states
that were subjects of extensive structural adjustment programs that may have contributed to their collapse.
See id. at 263; .
192
With reductions in the size of governments, unemployment rose in countries where the state was the
largest employer and privatizing state activities often contributed to more hardships for the working poor.
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 180–82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140–41; Orford, supra note 187, at
470–71.
193
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 180–82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140–41
.
194
Orford, supra note 187, at 456; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181; Rajagopal, From Resistance to
; PERPETUATING
Renewal, supra note 87, at 575; 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 14–15, 46–48
POVERTY, supra note 189, at 59–60.
195
For example, James Thuo Gathii opines that structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa primarily
focused on producing a conducive framework within which the repayment of the debts owed by African
states to international banks and lending agencies is facilitated, and the unhindered influx of new
international capital into these countries is secured. Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 207.
196
Structural adjustment programs typically involved currency devaluations, producer price increases, trade
liberalization, privatization, and a range of specific institutional changes prescribed under the heading of
“good governance.” Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53. See also, Antony
Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L.
REV. 887, 908 (2000) (discussing good governance and the IFI goal of furthering neo-liberal economic
polices through structural adjustment entailing privatization, trade liberalization and currency devaluation).
197
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181 (noting that regulations that protected labor, for example, were
usually early casualties of such policies); Orford, supra note 187, at 453–55. Higher interest rates may
attract foreign investors, but they can also inflict unbearable economic pressures on small businesses,
including farmers who may be forced to sell their land because they can no longer obtain operating capital.
3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 10, 47.
198
Trade liberalization often had devastating effects on Third World countries. Eliminating tariffs, for
example, can promote access to domestic markets, but it can also make it much more difficult for local
producers to compete against foreign suppliers; as local businesses fail, additional jobs are lost.
Encouraging export production also leads to the increased harvesting of cash crops, which can cause
domestic food shortages and accelerate soil erosion. SAPs thus tended to make countries more dependent
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on imported goods and manufactured items, and more predisposed to overexploit their natural resources. 3
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 47.
199
Tsai, supra note 84, at 1321; Orford, supra note 187, at 470.
200
Of course the specific terms of the agreements governing this assistance varied as did the actual
conditions imposed.
201
Id. at 470–71.
202
Tsai, supra note 84, at 1319; Galano III, supra note 84, at 323; Orford, supra note 187, at 470.
203
Watts, supra note 24, at 58.
204
As had been the case since 1961, the UN General Assembly declared yet another development decade,
to begin on January 1, 1990. Resolution 45/199 again declared the objective of accelerated development,
calling for a surge in the pace of economic growth in developing countries; a development process that is
responsive to social needs, seeks to reduce extreme poverty, promotes the development and utilization of
human resources and skills and is environmentally sustainable; an improvement in international monetary,
financial and trade mechanisms in support of development; a strong and stable world economy with sound
national and international macroeconomic management; the strengthening of international cooperation for
development; and special efforts to assist the least developed countries. G.A. Res. 199, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., 71st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/199 (1990).
205
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42. It is sometimes termed the three Ds: denationalization,
deregulation, and devaluation. Id.
206
For a discussion of these reports, which were promulgated throughout the 1990s, see Cammack, supra
note 120, at 157, 164.
207
The World Bank Group, CDF Proposal, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A
Discussion Draft) (Jan. 21, 1999) (memorandum from James D. Wolfensohn, President, to the Board,
Management, and Staff of the World Bank Group), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/cdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter “CDF
Proposal”]; Blake, supra note 55, at 160. According to this report, the World Bank would henceforth be
guided by four guiding principles: (1) development goals and strategies should be determined by
individual member states, and not by the World Bank; (2) development should be holistic in nature, so that
growth focuses not just on economic variables, but also on social and political implications; (3) the
development process should involve all actors affected by World Bank lending practices; and (4)
development policies should have a long-term focus. CDF Proposal, supra no
te 207, at 22 –24. The Bank
believes the CDF is an improvement over its previous adherence to macroeconomic indicators as the sole
gauge of a nation’s economic health, while acknowledging that the CDF has not met with universal
approval. See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Blake, supra note 55, at 177.
208
Structural aspects included good and clean governance, a well-organized financial system, and an
adequate social safety net to accommodate the short-term negative impact of some World Bank programs.
CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 10–12; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162.
209
Human aspects encompassed education, health, and population issues. CDF Proposal, supra note 207,
at 13–14; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162.
210
Physical characteristics for growth included quantifiable achievements in building infrastructure,
including adequate water and sewer systems, access to energy, access and transportation inlays. CDF
Proposal, supra note 207, at 15–18; see Blake, supra note 55, at 163.
211
Sector-specific aspects of development referred to strategies to promote the advancement of rural, urban,
and private sectors. CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 18–20; Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164.
212
Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164.
213
Weidner, supra note 141, at 223–24; Blake, supra note 55, at 163.
214
NGOs had long been critical of – and largely ignored by – the international financial institutions. The
Bank now invites selected NGOs to assist take part in development projects. By 1999, 52% of Bank
projects involved some type of NGO participation. Weidner, supra note 141, at 220. A rather striking and
wide-ranging example of NGO participation in World Bank programs began in 1995 when the Bank
entered into a joint initiative with the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative Network
(SAPRIN). Today, SAPRIN works in 17 countries where it consults with World Bank officials on the
effects of specific lending arrangements. The objective of SAPRIN is to legitimize local knowledge in the
analysis of economic-reform programs and to make space for, and institutionalize, grassroots involvement
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in macroeconomic decision-making. See Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International
Network, at http://www.saprin.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
215
Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 9.
216
Watts, supra note 24, at 58. The rationale behind building self-reliance was “the desire to release those
energies that permit ordinary people to take charge of their lives.” Id.
217
Civil society is also central in the alternatives to development paradigm, which has focused on “new
social movements.” Id. at 58. Both the new development economics of the 1990s and the antidevelopment paradigm assert alternative strategies; both speak of an expanded role for civil society and
both question the form, function and character of the developmental state. Id. at 59.
218
Id. at 58.
219
Uriz, supra note 108, at 204. The good governance initiative was defined as “a systematic effort to
build pluralistic institutional structures, a determination to respect the rule of law, and a vigorous protection
of freedom of the press and human rights.” Id.
220
Id. at 204–05 (noting that good governance has been criticized as entailing a variety of interventions that
are inconsistent with the Bank’s mandate and, as a doubtful solution to the multifaceted crises of the Third
World). Professor Gathii contends that “good governance” policies are based on the questionable
assumption that reducing governmental intervention in the economy will automatically increase economic
growth and personal freedom. The Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission on
Africa identified external economic dependence as a major factor in Africa’s poor economic performance
in the Lagos Report of 1980, and recommended that external dependence on Western countries be reduced
and replaced with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the
continent’s resources. Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 109. Professor Gathii also maintains
that the good governance agenda focuses too much attention on internal policy failures within Third World
countries and not enough on the historical and international economic factors that Southern governments
believe are the primary causes of their current difficulties. See Gathii, Africa Predicaments, supra note
110, at 1008 (noting that African governments take the opposite view of IFIs and other proponents of the
good governance agenda, and contrasting the Lagos Report with the Berg Report’s emphasis on improper
economic policies pursued by African governments as the main cause of the crisis and proposing a marketbased economic strategy).
221
See Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 108.
222
Cammack, supra note 120, at 164. This policy promoted a pattern of growth that would utilize the most
abundant asset possessed by the poor – their labor. The prevailing logic is that governments should pursue
policies that provide businesses (capital) across the globe with an adequate number of healthy and educated
workers, and to impose disciplines that ensure these workers remain available. Basic social services, such
as primary education, health care and family planning, which make it possible for the poor to work, are to
be made available and this would more easily allow capital to exploit the global labor market. Benefits are
to be targeted to potential workers, which then makes it difficult to survive outside of the labor market, and
creates safety nets that propel workers back into the market if they temporarily drop out.
223
Id. As Professor Cammack puts it, the CDF entails putting the poor to work, in the name of poverty
alleviation. Of course, it also means low wage workers for global capital.
224
For example, governments should provide health care, education, nutrition and family planning services,
which are spheres that often are not well-served by the private market. Id. at 166.
225
Id.
226
State managed stabilization policies to prevent recession or depression have given way to internationally
managed policies of restructuring, often deliberately inducing domestic recession; re-distributive taxation
to bring about greater equality of incomes has been abandoned in favor fiscal reform that rewards
entrepreneurship and accentuates inequality; measures to regulate prices have been dropped; public control
over the labor and money markets has been systematically stripped away; the indefinite extension of the
sphere of wants to be satisfied by public enterprise has been thrown into reverse and social security
legislation has been restructured to promote rather than work against market forces.” Id. at 164.
227
The IMF approach to the Third World has continued to evolve, but it has been “less comprehensive” in
its interventions in the name of development. Although it is outside the scope of its mandate, the IMF
expressly supports Third World economic growth. The IMF also now includes poverty alleviation among
its major goals, although its Articles of Agreement do not contemplate this objective. Carrasco, supra note
98, at 39–41; Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 569–74. The IMF created the
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Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999. As described by the IMF, this new endeavor
“aims at making poverty reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit element of
a renewed growth-oriented strategy.” Creation of the PRGF was significant because it was the first time
the IMF had officially declared that “growth-policies should be implemented in a framework in which the
pressing need to reduce poverty is also a central objective.” International Monetary Fund, Policy
Development and Review Department, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – Operational
Issues (Dec. 13, 1999), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited June 7, 2002)
[hereinafter PRGF]. Instead of pursuing strictly macroeconomic objectives, “high quality” economic
development has become the IMF’s new emphasis, and “high quality” development includes considering
the social and political consequences of IMF lending. Carrasco, supra note 98, at 569–74. “Good
governance” in borrowing countries is also currently a stated goal of the IMF, and thus the IMF’s stated
objectives are now more similar to those of the World Bank. Id.; PRGF, supra note 227. Unlike the World
Bank the IMF has not formalized relations with NGOs. Bradlow, supra note 98, at 77. The IMF continues
to utilize adjustment lending. PGRF, supra note 227. Yet even the IMF and World Bank acknowledge it is
problematic. See generally International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the
Financial Year Ended April 30, 1997, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/97/97imf.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (1998).
228
See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53 (noting that IFI loans are part of an
adjustment lending process and are supposed to ameliorate some of the consequences of the fundamental
changes the Bank requires countries to undertake); Chua, supra note 80.
229
The emergence of a “Third World,” that stood separate and apart from the first and second world also
emerged during this era, as did the nationalizations of oil companies, events that empowered and
emboldened nations in the Middle East. Given the raging Cold War, the time may also have been ripe to
make demands for social justice. The 1960s was also a time of political protest in the United States and
across Europe, and thus “demands” for justice were part of a larger trend, so to speak.
230
At this point, the demand for reparations has only been articulated in limited forums and within few
documents. See infra notes 295–96 and accompanying text for discussion in reparations. It cannot be
equated with the sustained movements for Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the New
International Economic Order, or the Right to Development.
231
Development law or the “law of development” was recognized as branch of international law in the
1960s. Héctor Gros Espiell, The Right of Development as a Human Right, 16 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 189, 190
(1981). After 1960 the United Nations began to give attention to the concept of development, and
gradually shaped a new juridical discipline, “the international law of development,” which attempted to
characterize, and make enforceable a system of rights and obligations. Id. Not to be confused with the
“law and development” discussed, see infra Part I.D, the international law of development comprises
principles promoting the economic and social development of the Third World, while seeking to strengthen
and assert in international relations. Nina M. Eejima, Sustainable Development and the Search for a Better
Environment, a Better World: A Work in Progress, 18 UCLA J. ENVT’L. L & POL’Y 99, 109 (1999/2000).
Indeed, the law of development rejects a key premise of law and development, holding instead that “[t]he
problem was not simply that economic and social institutions in the peripheral countries were not
modern…but rather that these societies were characterized by… structures where the economic and social
institutions were geared to meet the demands of developed societies rather than the needs of the developing
societies.” Chibundu, supra note 74, at 191
.
232
Although it gained widespread attention in the 1960s and 1970s, the roots of the law of development go
considerably deeper. Early antecedents include the Drago Doctrne, by which Latin American states sought
to prohibit armed foreign (i.e., U.S.) intervention predicated on civil disputes. See Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 9, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force Dec. 26,
1934). In 1902, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that forcible U.S.
intervention in Argentina to secure payment of debts allegedly owed to private U.S. citizens and companies
was unjustified and dangerous. Argentine Republic: “Monroe Doctrine” and Diplomatic Claims of
European Powers, in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUE 1903, Argentine Republic: “Monroe Doctrine” and Diplomatic
Claims of European Powers 1–5 (1903) (note from Luis M. Drago to the U.S. Department of State).
Professor Richard Falk has observed that the concept of a state protecting its nationals abroad has also been
used “as a means to impose the external will of richer and more powerful nations [on others].” Richard
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Falk, Historical Tendencies, Modernizing and Revolutionary Nations, and the International Legal Order. 8
HOW. L. J. 128, 133 (1962).
233
The European origin of an international law that purports to be “universal” was and remains a persistent
underlying theme. See, e.g., T.O. Elias, Modern Sources of International Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN
A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP 49 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972);
R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 55, 56 (1966); Jorge Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of
International Law, 15 INT’L ORG. 38, 39 (1961); B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED
WORLD 10 (1960); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 44 (Oxford University Press 1997). But the
problem was not merely with the origin of the law; the problem was with the law’s application. Judge
Philip C. Jessup, in describing the need for revising of traditional international law, acknowledged the
Third World view that “the rules of law were developed by the exploiting imperialistic powers to promote
their interests at the expense of the countries which in earlier centuries were either colonies or politically
and militarily weak and provided important sources of raw materials and perhaps labor to the exploiting
powers.” Philip C. Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 419
(1973).
234
See Snyder, supra note 76, at 737 (quoting COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM, 1964-1971 (1975)) (stating that underdevelopment theory is
… partly a correction and partly an expansion of Marx’s interpretation of history, an expansion of his
method and central ideas to a problem which, on a world scale, was still in embryo at his death: the failure
of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to follow a path of autonomous, capitalist development,
leading to their “regeneration” after they had been brought within the world capitalist economy).
Dependency theory has been criticized as accepting the fundamental premises of the development
paradigm. Id.
235
See Chibundu, supra note 74, at 189.
236
Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 209–11 (noting that since it was established in 1964 UNCTAD
has been “one of the forums used by the developing countries to press home their demand for a New
International Economic Order” and that it has become an “important intervener on behalf of less developed
countries in their relations with advanced industrial States” (quoting Robert S. Walters, UNCTAD:
Intervener Between Poor and Rich States, 7 J.W.T. L. 528 (1973))). UNCTAD’s recommendations are not
legally binding, however. See also VARGES, supra note 61, at 3 (discussing how unification enabled
developing countries to be a force that could not be ignored).
237
See VARGES, supra note 61, at 3. Dependency theorists acknowledged that developed countries may at
some time have been “undeveloped,” but argued that they never played the role of the “underdeveloped”
country within the world capitalist system. See Snyder, supra note 76, at 748.
The original centers of capitalism established their wealth and their power through incorporating
and exploiting other parts of the world. The primary accumulation of capital in the metropoles or
center was fed through a drain of wealth from the satellite or peripheral countries, typically
involving their colonization, a “surplus drain” which continues to the present day even if its forms
may have changed, and direct colonial rule is no longer a necessary condition of this process.
Id. at 726 (quoting Harry Bernstein, Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development?, in
DAVID LEHNMAN ED., DEVELOPMENT THEORY: FOUR CRITICAL STUDIES (David Lehmann ed., 1979)); see
also Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL.
L. REV. 841, 850 (2000). Using critical race theory to evaluate international law, Mutua states, “What the
world has witnessed in the last five centuries is the universalization of an international law that is particular
to Europe and seeks not universal justice, but an international legal order that erects, preserves and
embraces European and American domination of the globe.” Id.
238
Third World leaders warned that the unequal distribution of power threatens peace, and that permitting
the existence of such a system could potentially give rise to a “major worldwide revolution.” See VARGES,
supra note 61, at 6. Given the wholesale rejection of all aspects of the law of development, however, the
West apparently did not take this threat seriously, or perhaps believed it had other mechanisms at its
disposal to deal with outbreaks of violence.
239
See generally Schachter, supra note 109. Through the international law of development, dependency
theorists and their allies attempted to establish an enforceable system of rights and obligations based on
international law.
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240

According to Professor Espiell,
The affirmation that there is and there must be an international law of development,
implies an acceptance that law must be an instrument for the transformation of society, a
tool for effective action in the struggle of all peoples and all men against poverty,
dependence and ignorance. The international law of development must not be
understood as a mere compilation of norms relating to a single subject – development.
On the contrary, it constitutes a juridical system bound to enable development and hasten
it. It is, therefore, essentially a teleological law, whose characteristics are determined by
the mission assigned to it.
HÉCTOR GROS ESPIELL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO (1975), translated and quoted in
Espiell, supra note 231, at 190.
241
Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 471 (noting such demands as such as “preferential treatment, entitlement to
developmental assistance, debt relief, low interest loans or outright grants, and the low-cost transfer of
technology”).
242
Franz Xavier Perrez, The Relationship Between “Permanent Sovereignty” and the Obligation Not to
Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVT'L. L. 1187, 1190 (1996) (citing MILAN BULAJIC,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 269 (2d ed. 1993)).
243
See WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 28, 162, 168 (1972). The natural
resources at issue include a vast array of minerals as well as oil and gas.
244
Third World leaders believed that “the right to freely dispose of natural resources and wealth was the
seminal source of a series of corollary state rights, including the right to freely determine and control the
prospecting, exploration, development, exploitation, use and marketing of its natural resources and to
subject such activities to national laws within the limits of its exclusive economic jurisdiction under
prevailing international law.” See Eejima, supra 231, at 110.
245
Perrez, supra note 242, at 1190.
246
G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962
), reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 223 (1963). Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of eighty-seven to two, with twelve states
abstaining. See KAMAL HOSSAIN, SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY EDS., PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 91 (1984); Perrez, supra note
242, at 1191–92.
247
In 1952, Chile asserted the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources at the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.24 (1952). Also in 1952, The General Assembly
passed Resolutions 523 (VI) and 626 (VII), the latter entitled: “Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and
Resources.” G.A. Res. 523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119
(1952
) ; G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., 411th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.411 (1952). See
HOSSAIN, supra note 246, at 2.
248
See JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 184, 198, 199 (1988).
249
See HOSSAIN, supra note 246.
250
See MAKARCZYK, supra note 248.
251
See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1958); Sapphire Int’l
Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Cavin Arb. 1963); Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of
the Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (Arb. Trib. 1951) – all enforcing the validity of long-term pro-Western
concessions over the objections of Third World hosts. Consequently, nationalizing these concessions
bound host states to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation to the alien owners.
252
See Perrez, supra note 242, at 1191–92.
253
See Patrick Norton, A Law for the Future or a Law for the Past? Modern Tribunals and the Law of
International Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L. L. 474, 475–76 (1991); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of
the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465 (1963)
[hereinafter Schwebel, Permanent Sovereignty]. The “Hull formula” refers to a pronouncement by U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in connection with a 1938 dispute over Mexico’s nationalization of foreignowned oil fields. See G. HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655–65 (1942).
254
See G. Roy, Is the Law of the Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal
International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 863 (1961); M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL
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ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 895–
932 (1984).
255
G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 246, at 15. At the time of its adoption, the United States delegation argued
that the phrase “appropriate compensation” made “in accordance with international law” meant “prompt,
adequate and effective” compensation as required under international law. Andrew T. Guzman, Why
LDC’S Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 639, 649 (1998) (citing Schwebel, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 253).
256
Subsequent state practice of paying what amounts to prompt, adequate and effective compensation,
albeit often under pain of international economic ostracism or worse military intervention, has reinforced
the Hull formula. Industrialized states can now point to extensive state practice to support their position, as
well as a series of bilateral investment treaties that require payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. Guzman, supra note 255, at 64
8 . That Third World nations have taken these actions under
pain of economic banishment appears to be besides the point.
257
NICOLASS JAN SCHRIVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES
IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 3, 4 (2002).
258
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201(s_VI) (1974).
259
G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
260
Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. A/9946, 28 (Dec. 9, 1974) and U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281
(XXIX) (Jan 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (1974).
261
VARGES, supra note 61, at 5, 37.
262
Id.
263
CERDS was adopted by a General Assembly vote of 120 to six, with 10 abstentions. Belgium,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States
voted against the Charter. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway
and Spain abstained. See RALPH STUART SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD: A
DISCUSSION PAPER (1976).
264
In April 1972 President Echeverria of Mexico proposed that the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) draft a charter delineating the economic rights of nations. In May 1972
UNCTAD voted to establish a working group to draft such a charter; UNCTAD Res. 45 (III), U.N. Doc.
TD/180. The United States abstained from the vote, but agreed to participate in the Working Group. See
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS § 26.2, at 1166 (3d ed. 1995). The need for such a charter was explained by Mexico’s
Secretary of Foreign Relations:
[T]he underdeveloped countries…have decided not to continue to play a passive role, but
to be active participants in the changing of those structures that hinder their wellbeing…[T]he interdependence of all the components of the global economic system
demands a modification of the international structures that condition their behavior…The
greatest menace to peace that we face nowadays is the increasing tension and the very
noticeable separation between the industrialized countries and those which are
underdeveloped.
Emilio O. Rabasa, Address Before the 68th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
in 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 302, 303–05 (1974).
265
See JACKSON, supra note 264, at 1166–67.
266
Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 427, 438 (2001). Capital exporting states voted against this provision and have
never accepted it. Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter provides that each state has the right to:
Nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other
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peaceful means be sought on the basis of sovereign equality of States and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means.
Tali Levy, NAFTA’s Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of the
“Prompt, Adequate and Effective Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 423, 436 (1995).
267
Under the Charter, the right to supervise foreign business operations included the right to establish
performance requirements that would ensure that foreign investment served the economic and social
priorities of national development in the host nation. See G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260, at 52. Cohn,
supra note 266, at 438.
268
Cohn, supra note 266, at 53–54. Every state is also charged with a duty to cooperate in promoting the
steady and increasing expansion and liberalization of world trade. In a reference intended to accommodate
socialist nations, CERDS stipulated the right to engage in international trade and economic cooperation
irrespective of political and economic differences. Id. at 53–54, 438.
269
See Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 211.
270
See supra note 233 and accompanying text for discussion in European origins of international law. See
also, e.g., Elias, supra note 233; Anand, supra note 233; Castaneda, supra note 233, at 39; ROLING, supra
note 233, at 5; BRIERLY, supra note 233, at 44.
271
Makua wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1113, 1140 (1995); see also Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999).
272
Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations appealed for support for the NIEO this way:
Let us subject the fundamental economic elements for the future of world development to
the rule of law…. Let us codify norms and create an authentic body of rules that will
allow the international community to settle disputes and control abuses. Law represents a
force in itself that can become a basic source of innovation for society.
Emilio O. Rabasa, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 302,
303–05 (1974) (address at joint luncheon with the Section on International Law of the American Bar
Association). Secretary Rabasa also analogized specifically to various U.S. legislative measures such as
the Social Security Act of 1935, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, the Employment Act of 1946, and the Economic Opportunity act of 1964 as establishing a principle
of redistributing wealth for the protection and betterment of the disadvantaged within U.S. society. “Why
not then transfer the philosophy that has been the basis for this new process to the international field?” he
asked. Id.
273
See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT’L LAW 295, 300 (1975). There is continuing debate on
whether these resolutions reflected opino juris, that is evidence of what the overwhelming majority of states
believed the law to be, and whether simply voting for a resolution was the kind of state practice necessary
to form customary international law. Most western scholars have strenuously argued against according the
status of law to UN resolutions, especially after large Third World majorities began to find voice in the
General Assembly. Third World nations have taken the opposing view, arguing that at the least such
resolutions reflect some version of state practice or opino juris. See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1963).
274
Brower & Tepe, supra note 273, at 295, 300–01.
275
See Stephen M. Schwebel, Counselor on International Law, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the
68th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 209,
210–12 (1974). U.S. State Department attorney Stephen Schwebel summed up the Northern view:
If the Charter turns out to be simply a statement of the alleged rights of the developing
countries and the alleged duties of the developed, it will be a kind of bill of particulars, if
not an indictment, which will have no more impact on international economic affairs, not
to speak of international law, than a number of self-serving calls which developing
countries have issued in the past in UNCTAD and elsewhere.
Brower & Tepe, supra note 273.
276
See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of the Third World debt crisis.
277
Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2000) (“The NIEO challenged the status quo, and the far-reaching implications
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of its implementation, were met with substantial resistance by industrialized countries. Notwithstanding
these controversies, it is clear that many NIEO provisions have helped shape the right to development.”)
278
G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex at 186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1983).
279
The right to development purports to operate both collectively at the international level, and individually
at the domestic level. This evolution – from collective to both collective and individual, and from
international to both international and domestic – were key to the transition from the law of development to
the right to development. Espiell, supra note 231, at 192. “After initiation of the process designed to
establish a law of development and the right to develop, conceived of as a collective right, the idea of the
right to development as a human right that is a right belonging to individuals began to take shape.” Id. The
results of this transition can be seen in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESR”), G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), both of which incorporate many of
the principles of the human right to development.
280
It also sought to empower individuals and sub-national groups within individual countries. See G.A.
Res. 128, supra note 278, at arts. 1.1, 2.1, 2.3 (stating that individuals are the primary beneficiaries of the
right, and that both individuals and the state must work for “the constant improvement of the well-being of
the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting there from”).
281
See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting Keba M’Baye, First President of the Supreme Court of
Senegal, who emphasized this point in his 1972 speech introducing the right to development: “Economic
growth must be accompanied by socio-cultural progress; that means, in the simplest possible terms, that we
must give it a human dimension … growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement
of development”); Barsh, supra note 152, at 328 (stating that participants of the Global Consultations
concerned with the implementation of the right to development were “especially critical of international
development strategies which have been ‘oriented merely towards economic growth and financial
considerations’”); Forysthe, supra note 154, at 334.
282
The law of development asserted the need for a right of development similar to a human right, but this
right was thought to be a collective one – whereas human rights are typically thought of as individual.
Espiell, supra note 231, at 190.
283
See Bunn, supra note 277, at 1433; Mickelson, supra note 3, at 10; Espiell, supra note 231, at 192 (all
identifying Justice Keba M’Baye as author of the Right to Development). This pronouncement was made
in his inaugural lecture at the Third Session of Instruction of the International Institute for Human Rights.
Id.
284
Espiell, supra n 231, at 192 (quoting Keba M’Baye, Le Droit au développement comme un droit de
l’Homme, in 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 503, 505 (1972)). Following M’Baye’s lead, Professor
Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo of Spain also identified the Right to Development as a human right. Carrillo
Salcedo, El Derecho al desarollo como un derecho humamo, in 25 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 119–25 (1972) (“The right of development as a right of states and peoples must
unavoidably be founded on the recognition of the right of every man to a free and worthy life in his
community. Every human being has the right to live, which implies the right to aspire to an increasingly
better existence.”)).
285
Even the “development assistance” contributed by the North, he observed, served principally to enable
underdeveloped countries to become markets for Northern goods and services. See M’Baye, supra note
284, at 15 (noting that development assistance is “in many cases little more than a disguised export
subsidy,” designed to improve the underdeveloped countries’ ability to act as a market for the finished or
semi-finished products of the developed world); Mickelson, supra note 3, at 381–83 (Addressing M’Baye’s
observation that, “the deep division between the South and North posed an increasing threat to international
stability, and hence raising the standard of living in poor countries could be “a form of life insurance” for
rich countries. M’Baye also stated that since industrialized countries designed and benefited from the
current international economic system, they were responsible for its injurious consequences.) “Given their
power in the system and their utilization of that power to their own advantage, the rich countries of the
North should assume responsibilities for their actions.” Id. at 13 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 505,
521–22).
286
Mickelson, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 524).
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Id. at 14 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 529). See also Espiell, supra note 231, at 192 (quoting
M’Baye, supra note 284, at 515) (acknowledging M’Baye’s belief that “[e]ach man has the right to live and
the right to live better”).
288
It should be noted that in his 1972 speech, M’Baye expressed reservations concerning efforts to legalize
a human right to development. He maintained that these efforts were unnecessary because the human right
to development already existed. He also feared proponents of the right might lose sight of the desired end
and find “victory” in a mere legal declaration. See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 14. Accordingly, M’Baye
opposed those who called for completing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through by
proclaiming a Right to Development, because he regarded this as unnecessary, and perhaps even
counterproductive: “[I]t is hardly useful to encumber ourselves with a new proclamation, as if it were a
matter of creating a new right. The right to development is already inscribed in international law.” Id.
(quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 526).
289
Bunn, supra note 277, at 1436.
[I]n terms of international human rights law, the existence of the right to development is a
fait accompli. Whatever reservations different groups may have as to its legitimacy,
viability or usefulness, such doubts are now better left behind and replaced by efforts to
ensure that the formal process of elaborating the content of the right is a productive and
constructive exercise.
Id. (quoting Philip Alston, Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights
Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 106 (International Commission of
Jurists eds. 1981)). Proponents of the right to development maintain that it has a rich legal foundation that
includes the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice and other international conventions. Id.
290
See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to
Development, 15 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 473, 478 (1985). Scholars contesting its existence assert that these
conventions merely make explicit references to “development” which does not mean they support a right to
development.
291
Advocates reason that the lack of universal recognition or sanctions for non-adherence does not render
the UNDRD meaningless, given the initial rejection of many new international human rights. Espiell,
supra note 231, at 198 (“Consequently it is evident that the inadequacies that still plague the juridical
characteristics of the right of development in general, and particularly as an individual right, do not allow
the possibility of denying its legal existence, though it is still embryonic and imperfect.”)
292
One of the provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States foreshadowed
contemporary demands for reparations. Article 16 calls for restitution based on the injuries caused by
“colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neocolonialism and all forms of foreign aggression,
occupation and domination.” G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260.
293
M’Baye observed that since industrialized countries designed and benefited from the current
international economic system, they were responsible for its injurious consequences See Mickelson, supra
note 3, at 383 (“Given their power in the system and their utilization of that power to their own advantage,
the rich countries of the North should assume responsibilities of their actions.” (quoting M’Baye, supra
note 284)).
294
See, e.g., RODNEY, supra note 243.
295
Conceptually, reparations may be the simplest approach to international economic justice. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines reparation as both “[t]he act of making amends for a wrong” and [c]ompensation for an
injury or wrong, esp. for wartime damages or breach of an international obligation.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1301 (7th ed. 1999). Perhaps it is the natural successor to the NIEO and the right to
development, insofar as the simplicity of the demand for reparations represents an evolutionary focusing
and sharpening of the Third World position.
296
This may be because the simplicity and directness of the idea leaves virtually no room for obfuscation or
for “spinning” compensation as charitable assistance. Although reparations focus on repairing the injury
suffered by victims, assigning responsibility for payment seems to require the assignment of blame, and
this inevitably triggers belligerent resistance to reparations proposals. It explains, for example, the
European Union’s refusal, as recently as 2001, to apologize for Western Europe’s substantial role in the
Atlantic slave trade. At the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, the lead E.U. negotiator, Belgian
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Foreign Minister Louis Michel, equivocated thusly, “[s]lavery today is, of course, a crime against
humanity, slavery yesterday, in the past was of course… a very grave thing, a very horrible thing…It is
very difficult to consider that you can compare slavery today to slavery in the past.” Europeans at U.N.
Meeting Agree to Apology for Slavery – But Not to Reparations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MISSOURI),
Sept. 8, 2001, at 20.
297
The movement for reparations is really a collection of movements. See, e.g., RANDAL ROBINSON, THE
DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); RICHARD F. AMERICA, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: WHAT
WHITE AMERICA OWES BLACK AMERICA (1993) (in support of reparations); DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL
WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2003); David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why
Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks – and Racist Too, 31 BLACK SCHOLAR 48 (2002)
(opposing reparations). The reparations movement within the United States has had the benefit of
substantial scholarly analysis. For an excellent summary of legal issues and citations to a wealth of
writings on the topic, see Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for
Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2003). Much of the analysis focuses on substantive and
procedural legal issues that are specific to the U.S. legal system and on the anticipated legal battles over
reparations within the domestic U.S. context. See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the
Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies
Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993); Adrienne D. Davis, The Case for United States Reparations to
African-Americans, 7 HUM. RTS. BR. 3 (2000); BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2d
ed. 2003); Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968). However, scholars
in the U.S. – particularly within the legal academy – have also done a great deal of theoretical work that is
likely to be useful in support of Third World demands for international reparations. Some of this work is
litigation oriented, but based on principles that might also conceivably resonate with the general public.
Unjust enrichment is one such legal principle – and a politically interesting option because it does not
require blame or fault; only (basically) that a benefit has been received and retained, and that injustice will
result if the benefit is not disgorged. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999);
DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1999). Difficulties with the technical
application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment include calculating the benefit conferred and offsetting any
gain received by the plaintiffs, and tracing the benefit to its present holders. Brophy, supra note 297, at
522. In light of the anticipated difficulty of achieving reparations through litigation, some supporters of
reparations for African Americans are advocating a more overtly political approach that relies on the
legislative process. Id. at 523.
298
Held in September in Durban, South Africa, the 2001 WCAR was actually the third in a series (and is
thus sometimes referred to as the “Third World Conference Against Racism”). The first World Conference
Against Racism was convened in Geneva, Switzerland in August 1978, and attended by representatives of
125 countries, as well as observers from U.N. agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 92/40, U.N. Sales No. E79.XIV.2 (1978) [hereinafter RACISM
REPORT]. Because of a 1975 General Assembly Resolution equating Zionism with racism and racial
discrimination the United States and Israel boycotted the 1978 Conference. G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR,
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); RACISM REPORT, supra note 298. See also
U.S. Participation in the United Nations, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1977, at
172 (1977). The first Conference focused mainly on South Africa, with a majority of participating nations
favoring strong international measures to oppose and dismantle the apartheid regime. There was some
disagreement regarding the nature of the measures that should be taken against South Africa, and some
(mainly Western European) disagreement with the conference majority’s condemnation of Israel’s
treatment of the Palestinians. RACISM REPORT, supra note 298, at 15, 113, 129–30. A second World
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was held in August 1983. Geneva was again the
venue, South Africa and the Middle East were again the principal topics, and the United States again chose
not to attend because of the majority’s position on the latter. See id. As with the first conference, Western
commentators proclaimed the second conference a failure. See, e.g., Christopher N. Camponovo, Disaster
in Durban: The United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia,
and Related Intolerance, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 659, 667 (2003)). Despite majority agreement on
its principal themes and conclusions, in 1997, the General Assembly resolved to convene a third World
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Conference Against Racism, to be held in Durban, in the newly democratized South Africa. G.A. Res.
52/111, supra note 298.
299
Regional conferences were held in Strasbourg, France; Santiago, Chile; Dakar, Senegal; and Teheran,
Iran. In addition, five regional expert seminars were held in Geneva, Warsaw, Bangkok, Addis Ababa and
Santiago during 1999 and 2000. United Nations, World Conference Against Racism, Basic Information,
The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, at
http://www.un.org/WCAR/e-kit/backgrounder1.htm (last visited May 22, 2002).
300
For example, the Asian Preparatory Conference in Teheran concluded that “States which pursued
policies or practices based on racial or national superiority, such as colonialism or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, slavery, the slave trade and ethnic cleansing, should assume
responsibility … and compensate the victims of such policies and practices.” Reports of Preparatory
Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report of the Asian
Preparatory Meeting (Tehran, Feb. 19-21, 2001), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.189/PC.2/9 (2001). At the Santiago Regional Conference, representatives of countries in North,
Central and South America, and the Caribbean agreed to “take measures to alleviate inequities that still
persist because of the shameful legacy of slavery.” The delegates also condemned “the brutal crimes and
injustices that were committed against indigenous peoples and Africans and their descendants who were
subjected to slavery, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and other forms of servitude that today could constitute
crimes against humanity.” Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional
and National Levels, Report of the Regional Conference of the Americas (Santiago, Chile, Dec. 5-7, 2000),
U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/7 (2001)
[hereinafter Santiago Report].
301
These matters that were not addressed in the documents adopted by the European regional conference in
Strasbourg . See Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and
National Levels, Final Documents of the European Conference Against Racism (Strasbourg, France, Oct.
11-13, 2000), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/6
(2001). Only over the strenuous objections of the United States and Canada, did the Santiago conference
acknowledge that slavery was an international crime, resulting in:
[S]ubstantial and lasting economic, political and cultural damage to these peoples and…
justice now requires substantial national and international efforts to repair such damage.
Such reparation should be in the form of policies, programmes and measures adopted by
the States, which benefited materially from these practices, and designed to rectify the
economic, cultural and political damage, which inflict the affected communities and
peoples.
Santiago Report, supra note 300, at 14, 70.
302
The African regional Conference in Dakar, Senegal focused primarily on slavery and colonialism. The
Declaration adopted by the Dakar conference stated:
[T]he slave trade, …colonialism and apartheid…have had profound crippling effects on
the economic development of Africa and…justice now requires that substantial national
and international efforts be made to repair the damage; …States which pursued racist
policies or acts of racial discrimination such as slavery and colonialism should assume
their moral, economic, political and legal responsibilities…and provide adequate
reparation to those communities or individuals who, individually or collectively, are
victims of such racist policies or acts, regardless of when or by whom they were
committed.
Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report
of the Regional Conference of Africa (Dakar, Jan. 22-24, 2001), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/8 (2001) [hereinafter Dakar Report]. The Dakar delegates
recommended that a follow-up mechanism be established and entrusted with supervising implementation of
the Declaration and Programme of Action to be adopted by the World Conference, and that such
mechanism be required to report annually to the United Nations General Assembly. Id.
303
The Programme of Action adopted by the Dakar conference included the following language:
An International Compensation Scheme should be set up for victims of the slave trade, as
well as victims of any other transnational racist policies and acts… A Development
Reparation Fund should be set up to provide resources for the development process in
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countries affected by colonialism…[S]uch reparation should be in the form of enhanced
policies, programmes and measures to be adopted by States which benefit materially
from these practices in order to rectify, through affirmative action, the economic, cultural
and political damage which has been inflicted on the affected communities and peoples in
the full implementation of their right to development.
Id.
304

On the fourth day of the Durban conference, the United States and Israel withdrew their delegations in
protest over the decided likelihood that the Conference would condemn Israel for its treatment of the
Palestinians. Rachel L. Swans, U.S. and Israelis quit Racism Talks over Denunciation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2001, at A1; Douglas Blackmon, U.S., Israel Pull Delegates out of U.N. Conference on Racism, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A12. A few days after the Conference ended, the World Trade Center in New York
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. were attacked on September 11, 2001. N.R. Kleinfeld, U.S.
Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2001, at A1. These events diverted Western media attention first from the issue of reparations and then
from the Conference in its entirety.
305
Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance (Durban, Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001), U.N. ESCOR, at 5–27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2002)
[hereinafter Durban Report]. See also Celina Romany & Katherine Culliton, The UN World Conference
Against Racism: A Race-Ethnic and Gender Perspective, 9 HUM. BRTB No.2, at 14, 15 (2002); Nicole
Itano, Former Colonies Calling for Reparations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 5, 2001, at A-1, available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0905/p1s4-wogi.html. Proponents of reparations – notably the African
delegates who had met at the Dakar regional conference – also sought apologies for slavery and
colonialism, noting “other groups that were subjected to other scourges and injustices have received
repeated apologies from different countries, as well as ample reparations, on a bilateral basis, from both
public and private sources and lately through certain international organizations.” Dakar Report, supra
note 302, at ¶ 29. Certain Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned during
World War II, and South Africans have obtained some form of reparations in recent years. Brophy, supra
note 297, at 499. Australia, Austria, France, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom – as well as religious denominations and multinational corporations – have in recent years offered
apologies for past wrongs. William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations,
– 6
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5
(2002/2003). Professor Brophy adds that U.S. President Clinton “apologized for, was part of apologies for,
or discussed apologizing for slavery, the genocide in Rwanda, executions of civilians during the Korean
war, the United States’ support of Guatemala’s military while it committed genocide, medical experiments
on African Americans at Tuskegee, radiation experiments, and the deprivation of native Hawaiians’ land.”
Brophy, supra note 297, at 501. Professor Bradford has termed this an age of apology. Bradford, supra
note 305, at 5–6; Brophy, supra note 297, at 501. Apologies would not be extended at this Conference,
however. The U.S. delegation withdrew from the Conference and did not endorse the final Declaration.
Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 48 (2002). European Union delegates avoided apologizing, declined to offer
reparations, and refused to acknowledge that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was a crime against humanity at
the time it occurred. Michael Slackman, Divisive U.N. Race Talks End in Accord, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2001, at A1.
306
Durban Report, supra note 305, at 14. The Declaration also proclaimed that “slavery and the slave trade
are a crime against humanity.” Id.
307
Id. at 158.
308
For example, Fode Dabor, an ambassador from Sierra Leone and a member of the African negotiating
committee at the Durban Conference, said, “[t]his is very bad, very disappointing, but we all had to go
along because no one wanted to take the blame for the conference collapsing. We lost on everything, the
question of the apology, the question of the slave trade and the question of reparations.” Slackman, supra
note 305. Moreover, Western press accounts of the conference were overwhelmingly negative – many
amounting, in fact, to ridicule of the Conference and the positions asserted by its majority. See, e.g.,
Lantos, supra note 305, at 48; Anne Bayesfsky, The U.N. World Conference Against Racism: A racist antiracism conference, American Society of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING 65–74
(2002); Camponovo, supra note 298, at 667.
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See supra note 301 and accompanying text for discussion in U.S. objections given their role in the slave
trade and that perhaps there is no real regret for colonialism, slavery or other forms of exploitation.
310
The Durban conference contributes importantly to strengthening the case that is already
supported by the great majority of the membership of the United Nations. Samir Amin, World
Conference Against Racism: A People’s Victory, 53 MONTHLY REV. 7, 20 (2001).
311
See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979).
312
Tucker, supra note 64, at 1.
313
As Professors Kothari and Minogue note, when development is explored as an idea, one is in the realm
of theory. When objectives are established, one is delineating the process by which ideas are turned into
practice. Examining actual practice entails analysis of these activities. Of course, even the idea of
development is contested territory. Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 12. The meaning of development
in practice is also contested. See supra note 112, 143 and accompanying text for discussion in the cycles of
conventional wisdom.
314
This term is used is used in the broader Foucauldian sense of discourse:
The key feature is that the world is not simply “there” to be talked about, rather it is
through discourse itself that the world is brought into being. It is also in such a discourse
that speakers and hearers, writers and readers, come to an understanding about
themselves, their relationship to each other and their place in the world (the construction
of subjectivity). It is the “complex of signs and practices which organizes social
existence and social reproduction”… There are certain unspoken rules controlling which
statements can be made and which cannot within the discourse, and these rules determine
the nature of the discourse…. These rules concern such things as classification, the
ordering and distribution of that knowledge of the world that the discourse both enables
and delimits.
BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., KEY CONCEPTS IN POST-COLONIAL STUDIES 71 (1998). For a definition that uses
law as an example of discourse, see HERBERT KOHL, POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL THINKING 59
(1993).
315
Ideology has been defined as:
Ideas, attitudes, and values that represent the interests of a group or class of people.
These ideas are expressed through the arts, and in all of the ways in which a group within
a society displays its perception of the world…. Ideas do not express realities so much as
the values of the people who control society. They are false in that they claim truth and
universality even though they are rooted in historically based economic relationships.
Analyzing an ideology consists . . . of discovering how dominant systems of ideas relate
to the actual needs, demands, and self-descriptions of the ruling class.
HERBERT KOHL, FROM ARCHETYPE TO ZEITGEIST POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL THINKING 59 (1992).
316
Postmodernism is a rejection of modernity and is characterized by the acceptance of ephemerality,
fragmentation, discontinuity and attacks on the notion that there might be a metalanguage or metatheory
through which all things can be connected or represented. There is “an intense distrust of all global or
totalizing discourses, a rejection of metanarratives, of large-scale theoretical interpretations, of universal
application. Postmodernism also rejects the Hegelian view of history and the idea of progress.” MADAN
SARUP ET. AL., IDENTITY, CULTURE AND THE POSTMODERN WORLD 95 (1996).
317
The entire idea of development epitomizes modernity, which has been described as follows:
Modernity is usually perceived as positivistic, technocratic and rationalistic. It has been identified with the
belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization
of knowledge and its production. The modernity project came into focus during the eighteenth century, and
was an extraordinary intellectual effort on the part of Enlightenment thinkers to develop objective science,
universal morality and autonomous art. Enlightenment thinkers embraced the idea of progress; they
believed in justice and in the possibility of the human happiness. SARUP, supra note 316, at 94; Jane L.
Parpart, Post-Modernism, Gender and Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 253 (Jonathan Crush, ed.
1995).
318
Tucker, supra note 64, at 2 (Postulating that it may be because the “myth of development” is part of the
social imaginary of Western societies, that despite the transfer of goods, gadgets, capital, technology,
hospitals and roads, the economic and socioeconomic accomplishments of the West have not necessarily
been replicated in Third World countries. He also notes that the economic, social and political

Deconstructing Development – Gordon/Sylvester
Page 83 of 92
transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and reproduction of meanings,
symbols and knowledge that is cultural reproduction.).
319
Id.
320
For critical analysis of these and other widely accepted development concepts, see THE DEVELOPMENT
DICTIONARY, supra note 1.
321
See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44 (“Western civilization is not located in a geographical space, for in
these days of globalization it envelopes the globe with its desires, images, politics, and consumer and
cultural products.”).
322
ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91. By the eighteenth century, the concept of Europe was solidly
constructed as a sign of superiority and as being in opposition to the rest of the world’s cultures.
Eurocentrism is also present in the very existence of such fields as anthropology, in the assumptions and
practices of Christianity through mission education and mission activity, and in the assumed superiority of
Western mathematics, cartography, art and numerous other cultural and social practices which have been
claimed, or assumed to be based on a universal, objective set of values. Id. at 91–92.
323
For instance, the West defines “civilization” by reference to technology, thereby measuring other
civilizations by technological capabilities. The Eurocentric idea of nation-state has been deemed to be the
only desirable and legitimate form of political organization, forcing non-Western societies to organize in
this manner. Groups without a state are viewed as people without a home, such as the Kurds, gypsies and
Jews before the state of Israel was established. Freedom is defined in a way that does not incorporate basic
needs such as hunger and housing or the subordination of freedom for more eminent goals such as
community and tradition. Instead the focus is the individual – which is the epitome of the Western view of
freedom. All of these Eurocentric categories play an intrinsic role in development. Sardar, supra note 55,
at 49.
324
ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91–92.
325
The non-West includes intellectuals, academics, writers, thinkers, novelists, politicians and decisionmakers in Asia, Africa and Latin America who use the West as the yardstick for measuring the social and
political progress within their own societies. Accordingly, the non-West promotes Eurocentrism, both
wittingly and unwittingly, and colludes in its own victimization while simultaneously maintaining the
global system of inequality. Sardar, supra note 55, at 44.
326
Whether employing such terms as First World and Third World, or describing developed nations as
post-industrial societies or as nations in the throes of advanced capitalism and the non-West as merely
industrializing, Eurocentrism cannot be expunged from the concept of development. “Development
continues to mean what it has always meant: a standard by which the West measures the non-West.” Id. at
49.
327
Notwithstanding the at times dubious motivations of its proponents, modernization or progress as
defined by the West is not by definition objectionable – although its desirability can certainly be debated.
Indeed, it has been the subject of much debate. For a variety of perspectives, see THE POST-DEVELOPMENT
READER, supra note 11. Rather, it is to suggest that although the dominant Western view is only one
perspective, it has been held to be the universal point of reference and the only perspective deemed worthy
of shaping countless lives for the last fifty-five years; other views have been dismissed as invalid or
irrelevant. Esteva, supra note 1, at 6.
328
For a discussion of natural law in both its traditional and modern permutations, see Brian Bix, Natural
Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 223 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
329
For example, despite the challenges dependency theory presented to the prevailing economic order, it
shared many of the underlying premises of the modernization discourse, never questioning the desirability
of development and conceiving of it in terms of economic growth, industrialization and liberal democracy.
Tucker, supra note 64, at 14. The postmodern critique itself can be criticized as being part of the Western
imagination and Western discourse and its demolition of such grand narratives as religion, tradition and
history may be inimical to the interests of the non-West for it is these things that make the non-West, the
non-West. Sardar, supra note 55, at 45.
330
Professor Kiely warns that dismissing development as Eurocentrism is “too simplistic, for it
homogenizes both the West and the Third World and reduces the latter to passive recipients of the ideas of
the former. It then becomes difficult to imagine how the people of the Third World could behave in any
way other than being simple puppets of the West.” He contends that a satisfactory analysis of development
would regard it not only as a European creation, but also as a reflection of the responses, reactions and
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resistance of the people who are its objects. He cautions that critics be careful to not reduce development
to an idea without a history and that is impervious to change, when in fact development discourse – its
language, strategy and practice – has changed over time, both in response to previous strategies and to
shifts in power relations in the world. Kiely, supra note 7, at 36.
331
At the level of policy makers, who are comprised of and national and international elites, the West has
largely won the political, social and ideological battle. Most Third World elites attend university in the
West, have professors and teachers from the West, and have in many respects accepted the Western view of
the world. Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the preponderance of universities, institutes, research
grants and foundations in the West, all of which support and solidify certain world views). Those who
reject a Eurocentric worldview are marginalized as radicals, fundamentalists, cultural nationalists, or as
being irrational, crazy or otherwise to be dismissed. See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44
– 62
. At the grassroots
level, the acceptance or rejection of Eurocentricity may be more complex. Here resistance to development
can be found in myriad acts that are often classified as ignorance or lack of common sense. These voices
are reduced to what post-colonialist term “clamor.” Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International
Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827, 835 (2000) [hereinafter Gordon, Critical Race Theory].
332
SARUP ET. AL., supra note 316, at 94. (discussing the enlightenment foundations of modernity).
333
Sardar, supra note 55, at 44, 47–49.
334
Tucker, supra note 64, at 1.
335
Indeed these underlying assumptions are so taken for granted that they often escape critical scrutiny. Id.
at 7.
336
See, e.g., Teodor Shanin, The Idea of Progress, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at
65.
337
Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.
338
MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 38. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text on
Modernization theory.
339
Sardar, supra note 55, at 49.
340
Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Under the rubric of modernization, Westernization gained the status of a
universal goal and destiny. Progress became not only inevitable, but also obligatory and orthodox
development hinged on the absolute certainty of universal modernity. To the “West development” and
“modernization” characterized efforts by those in the Third World whom they implicitly assumed to be
destined to achieve their levels of consumption. Id. See also Jose Maria Sbert, Progress, in THE
DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 192.
341
Colonialism was legitimized and grounded in part in a racial discourse that defined white Europeans as a
superior race with a superior culture, and other races as inferior and in need of being civilized by whites.
See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 908–09
; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra
note 13, at 14–15. This raises questions regarding the role of race and culture in constructing development
as discourse, as the largely colored colonized world became the colonized and then the underdeveloped
Other. While race is only one of many factors, it is an additional means to separate developers from “the
other.” It may make it is easier to view such peoples as incapable and, implicitly, as inferior. See, e.g.,
Leonard Frank, The Development Game, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 262 (A
Canadian described the make-up of his development project assessment “team” that it included an
American, a Korean, a Japanese, a Dane, and a Bangladeshi, thrown in only for color. He also admits his
surprise and discomfort when the “Other” looked too white). Certainly there are also issues of class, and
Third World elites also generally promote the development project. It has been demonstrated that
development theory and practice is gendered. See, e.g., Kothari, supra note 23, at 39. Yet the Third World
is largely the colored world and thus it is at least worth questioning the degree to which race figures into
the international hierarchy that development epitomizes. Power within development discourse resides in
the West, and more specifically in international institutions that are dominated by western, and primarily
white, nations. This is not to say that these Institutions do not employ people from many nations, including
people of color from all parts of the world. Nonetheless, the policies that emanate from these institutions
are formed in Western capitals and institutions. Markets now dominate, because the U.S. has decided that
markets dominate. To work in these Institutions one must believe in the models they propound.
Alternative views are simply absorbed, watered-down co-opted, or dismissed.
342
Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12 (discussing trusteeship and colonialism as part of the
civilizing mission and the white man’s burden of uplifting the natives); Parpart, supra note 316, at 261.
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343

In its simplest formulation, “post-colonial” or “postcolonial” refers, chronologically, to the post
independence period. However, since the late 1970s, the term has had a more complex meaning and is
utilized to discuss the various cultural effects of colonization. See ASHCROFT ET AL., supra noe 314, at 186.
Postcolonial theory has been described as an “umbrella term for diverse critical approaches that deconstruct
Western thought, and refers not to a simple periodisation but rather to a methodological revisionism that
enables a wholesale critique of Western structures of knowledge and power.” Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.
For a discussion of the shifting and sometimes vague distinctions between postcolonial and post-colonial,
see ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 186–92.
344
Kothari, supra note 23, at 36–37 (noting that there may not be a clear distinction between the before of
colonialism and the after of independence, that can be viewed as two sharply contrasting periods separated
by the moment of decolonization).
345
Indeed, as early as 1937, one colonial governor said, “the exploitation theory… is dead, and the
development theory has taken its place.” Bernard Bordillon, The African Producer in Nigeria, WEST
AFRICA, Jan 30, 1937, at 75, cited in 1 DEVESH KAPUR ET AL, supra note 30, at 96 n.35. It took a while
after the governor’s insight for the rhetoric to change, but change it did. See Kothari, supra note 23, at 37
(discussing the extent to which the end of colonialism may or may not have signaled an end to empire,
although it did effectively suggest the end of a specific form of imperialism even as imperial interest and
global reach continued to be present).
346
Parpart, supra note 316, at 261. This language then provides the rationale for the neo-classic marketoriented reforms being forced on Third World governments with the promise that they will reconstruct their
economies. Id.
347
Escobar, Planning, supra note 157, at 135.
348
While colonial discourse constructed an obligation to undertake the white man’s burden and civilize the
natives, such considerations were clearly secondary to the economic and political aspects of colonialism.
With development, the West now had an obligation, and indeed was morally obligated to intervene in the
Third World and modernize the underdevelopment.
349
Kothari, supra note 23, at 39. Professor Kathari continues that “the boundaries and distinctions that
formerly marked the power relations between colonizers and the colonized continue to be played out, and
are reinscribed on the relationship between development and administrators and recipients of aid.” Id.
350
Sbert, supra note 340, at 192.
351
Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that the media is based in Western nations and is accompanied by
the overwhelming dominance of European and North American Universities, foundations, institutes and
research resources. Western scholars can obtain grants to study in the Third World, while it is more
difficult for Third World scholars to study in the West, and when they do; they are socialized into the
dominant paradigms of Western thinking. The unequal relationship that persists between the West and the
Third World is an integral part of this process).
352
Id.
353
That the Other is lacking, deficient and inferior follows from a colonial discourse that viewed certain
races and peoples as inferior and in need the benefits of civilization dispensed by their colonizer. See
generally Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12; BASIL DAVILSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN
AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE (1993).
354
On “helping,” see Marianne Gronemeyer, Helping, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at
53.
355
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40–41.
356
Id. at 41 (noting that “abnormalities were identified, such as the illiterate, the underdeveloped, the
malnourished, small farmers, or landless peasants, which development would later treat and reform”).
357
Additional subjects included cities, rural areas, housing, schools, factories, hospitals, towns, regions and
habitat. These ever-proliferating categories came from a range of sources, including governments,
universities, research centers and the expanding international institutional edifice. Other categories and
objects, such as cultural attitudes and values and the existence of racial, religious, geographic, or ethnic
factors that were believed to be associated with backwardness, were later introduced, but with more caution
or surreptitiously. Id. at at 41–42. Professor Escobar notes that the never-ending specification of problems
required detailed observation at all levels of a particular society, and accordingly complete profiles of
countries were developed and elaborated. Id. at 42. The techniques for gathering this data have been
refined and expanded. Indeed a cursory examination of the World Bank’s Website confirms this, for
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complete country profiles of most countries can be found covering a wealth of information. See infra notes
378–79 and accompanying text for discussion in the reliability of this data and its place in World Bank
analysis.
358
“Client categories” were created and proliferated as populations were consistently and continually found
to be lacking and in need of treatment and reform. ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at at 41.
359
Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Development planners and practitioners often dismiss as inconsequential
the voices of the individuals whose impoverishment they seek to address. Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.
360
There is a close connection between control over knowledge and assertions of power. For example,
Western scientific knowledge is represented as universally valid and thus applicable to all, but not everyone
qualified as an expert.
361
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41; Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Adaptation became a key concept, for
peoples and groups had to adapt. Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.
362
See Anders Narman & David Simon, Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE
CURRENT PROSEPCTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 8 (David Simon et al. eds.,
1999). For a revealing account from inside the development community, see Frank, supra note 342, at 262.
This account of how a multinational team of experts approved a project to develop a rural area on the
North-West frontier of Afghanistan demonstrates that when the “facts” do not fit reality, reality is ignored;
that local knowledge is purposely ignored when it would mean that expert knowledge is unnecessary; that
areas can be “hot” for all sorts of reasons, having very little to do with the needs of local people; and that
the objects of development are presumed to be people of color (Mr. Frank notes his surprise that these
people were not the colored people he usually encountered on such missions). See also ESCOBAR, supra
note 19, at 41. Moreover, the expert focus on promoting change at any cost raises issues of cultural
imperialism.
363
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 45. Escobar queries: why cash crops (to generate foreign exchange, and
thus to obtain capital and technology) and centralized planning, instead of participatory and decentralized
approaches; why agricultural development based on large mechanized farms, instead of alternative
agricultural systems based on smaller farms, ecological considerations, integrated cropping and pest
management; why rapid economic growth, but not internal markets to satisfy the needs of the masses of
people; why capital intensive, but not labor intensive solutions. Some of these choices are now being
considered, given the profound disasters facing many developing countries and their developers. But this
reconsideration still takes place within the developmental framework. Id. at 43.
364
The historical and cultural location of the “expert” may make it impossible to shake off this status, by
simply adopting participatory techniques, for it is a question of political power. Kothari, supra note 23, at
39. For a detailed critique of participation, see Rahnema, supra note 11, at 116.
365
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (noting that communities responded to the development agenda in
myriad ways that sometimes incorporated resistance, and there were manifold failures as developers tried
and failed to bring about modernization); Kothari, supra note 23, at 39 (noting development planners and
practitioners often dismissed as inconsequential, the voices of the individuals whose impoverishment and
marginality they were seeking to address); Tucker, supra note 64, at 7–8 (Observing that development was
not conceived of as a cultural process. Rather culture was a “residual variable that would disappear with
the advent of modernization. Thus it is unsurprising that development has wrecked havoc on Third World
cultures, ironically in their name and in their interest. These multiple and varied encounters “were
subsumed under the category of tradition, an essentially pejorative term that denoted divergence from the
generally accepted norms of reason and progress.”).
366
Tucker, supra note 64, at 13.
367
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41.
368
Esteva, supra note 1, at 13. See generally THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1
(deconstructing such familiar “devspeak” terms as, inter alia, planning, participation, poverty, progress,
population, needs, helping, development).
369
Kothari, supra note 23, at 38; ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (remarking that it is “Western dominated
institutions that determine the practices and procedures for all problems, theories, or objects that surface
and are then named, analyzed and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan”).
370
ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41.
371
Within the broad parameters of the policies set by the West, Third World countries may have some
agency over the specifics and emphasis of projects. See Frank, supra note 342, at 262.
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372

Koth
ari , supra note 23, at 39. Professor Kathori continues that “the boundaries and distinctions that
formerly marked the power relations between colonizers and the colonized continue to be played out, and
are reinscribed within the relationship between development and administrators and recipients of aid.” Id.
373
The following discussion of Egypt can be found in Timothy Mitchell, The Object of Development
America’s Egypt, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 129–57 (Jonathan Crush ed., 1995). Professor Mitchell
contends that the following description of Egypt can be found in almost any study of Egypt produced by an
American or an international development agency:
The geographical and demographic characteristics of Egypt delineate its basic problem.
Although the country contains about 386,000 square miles, . . . only a narrow strip in the
Nile Valley and its Delta is usable. This areas of 15,000 square miles – less than 4
percept of the land – is but an elongated oasis in the midst of desert. Without the Nile,
which flows through Egypt for about a thousand miles without being joined by a single
tributary, the country would be part of the Sahara. Crammed into the habitable area is 98
per cent of the population . . . the population has been growing rapidly and is estimated to
have doubled since 1947.
The popularity of this image of space and numbers is summed up in a World Bank report: “These two
themes – the relatively fixed amount of usable land and the rapid growth of the population – will be seen as
leitmotifs in the discussion of Egypt’s Economic problems.” Moreover, the image of a traditional rural
world implies a system of agriculture that is static and therefore incapable of changing itself; thus any
impetus for change must come from the outside. Yet political and economic changes in rural Egypt have
taken place since the Middle Ages. Ignoring these transformations creates the impression that the poverty
of the Nile Valley is a traditional poverty of a peasantry that only recently joined the twentieth century.
Thusonly external forces can provide the impetus to transform Egyptian agriculture. New capital
investment, new irrigation methods, improved seed varieties and cut flowers, all of which will bring the
foreign capital required to finance such technologies, become the principal means to achieve this
transformation.
374
The World Bank posits that “the development problem is essentially a question of the quantity, quality
and proportion of resources to be devoted to development on the one hand and to economic management on
the other.” Thus the productive limits imposed by nature will be overcome by the forces of technology,
while existing natural resources will be made more productive by more efficient management, which turns
out to mean dismantling the bureaucracy of the Egyptian state and permitting market forces to work their
magic. Mitchell, supra note 373, at 139.
375
Professor Mitchell questions why population densities in Egypt are compared to those in Bangladesh
and Indonesia, rather than say Belgium or South Korea where population densities “are respectively three
and four times higher than Indonesia.” Id. In other words, high population density is not necessarily an
indication of overpopulation. While Egypt’s population level per hectare of arable land is similar to that of
Bangladesh, and about double that of Indonesia, this comparison is misleading for Egyptian output per
hectare is more than three times that of both countries. A more realistic comparison might be with the
Philippines and Thailand, countries that are similar in total population and per capita gross national
product, combined with far greater areas of cultivated land. But even with less land, Egypt’s agricultural
population produces more crops per person than either of these countries. Professor Mitchell also asserts
that there is no prima facie evidence for the assumption that Egypt’s population of 50 million is too large
for its cultivable area. On a global level, given the demand on resources that the average Egyptian makes
on world resources, versus the average citizen of industrialized countries, it is arguable whether Egyptian
population growth threaten the world’s limited resources. But the corollary to the population argument is
the rate at which the population is growing and that this rapid growth is surpassing the country’s ability to
feed itself. Id. at 131–32.
376
Mitchell notes that according to World Bank tables, between 1965 and 1980, Egypt’s population grew at
an annual rate of 2.1 percent a year, but agricultural production grew at an even faster rate of 2.7 percent a
year. Thus it is not true that the population has been growing faster that the county’s ability to feed itself.
He maintains that the reason Egypt has had to import increasing amounts of food can be found by
examining the kinds of food being consumed and who gets to consume it. Egypt actually has a high rate of
calorie consumption, with average protein consumption exceeding that found in most middle and highincome countries. The problem is that the shift has come in higher levels of food consumption among the
better off, and most especially a higher consumption of meat, which means that food production has in part
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shifted to food for animals that are then slaughtered and sold as meat. It is the switch to meat consumption,
rather than an increase in population that has required the dramatic increase in food imports. Id. at 132–36.
377
The image of a narrow strip of fertile land crammed with millions of inhabitants enables the analysis of
Egyptian economic development to quickly eclipse the issue of access to land, because with so many
people occupying so little space the problem appears to be explained. Images are painted of millions of
tiny parcels and not enough land to go around. (The average size of a holding is two feddans, 94% of all
owners have less than five feddans each, and only 0.2 percent have at least 50 feddans each.) But given the
extremely fertile soils, year-round sunshine and permanently available irrigation water, very high yields can
be obtained from two or even three crops a year and thus holdings of less than five feddans are not as small
as they may seem and are well above the minimum farm size required for a family farm to feed itself
(estimated at 0.8 feddans). These figures also fail to mention that the remaining six percent of landowners,
with holdings from five feddans up to the legal limit of 50 feddans per individual or 100 feddans per family
with dependent children, controlled 33 percent of the country’s agricultural area and this concentration is
increasing. It may also be that these official figures, which rely on village land registers, under-represent
the concentration of landholding. Id. at 136–39.
378
For a discussion of how World Bank data and studies are created and utilized, see Gavin Williams,
Modernizing Malthus The World Bank, Population Control and the African Environment, in POWER OF
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 158 (analyzing a World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa and noting
how data and impressive looking tables are often included, but bare little relation to the report, that much of
the research that is commissioned is of poor quality and when it is good, it is not used or is shaped to fit
pre-determined outcomes). See also Frank, supra note 342, at 262.
379
The development project never sees itself as part of the problem and therefore developers rarely
acknowledge responsibility for development’s many failures. The World Bank acknowledges failures, but
seldom acknowledges its involvement in such failures. Typically the blame is placed on its partner
governments, and sometimes on the people themselves. An example can be found in the World Bank’s
analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, which in itself is questionable given the great variety of cultures,
conditions, environmental settings and other factors that can be found in Africa. The Bank does not ask
whether whole approaches, such importing chemical and mechanical technologies might be inappropriate.
Instead it recommends more of the same. The environmental consequences of World Bank strategies are
rarely considered. Instead, African women are identified as a cause of environmental damage. The Bank
overlooks the consequences of mechanized farming and chemical fertilizers, and of damns and irrigation
projects. The Report on Sub-Saharan Africa also draws no distinction between pastoralists and cultivators,
or between capitalist farms and peasant smallholdings. Moreover, World Bank projects consistently
privilege large-scale farmers who are politically influential, easier to reach and responsive to advice from
project officials. Williams, supra note 378, at 158, 165. Much credit is claimed for perceived successes,
however, such as the so-called Asian miracles of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. This
too is a constructed space for it is doubtful that these “successes” had anything to do with the prescriptions
advanced by development agencies. See O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 113–34.
380
Professor Mitchell notes:
The discourse of international development constitutes itself in this way as an expertise
and intelligence that stands completely apart from the country and the people it describes.
Much of this intelligence is generated inside organizations such as the World Bank and
USAID, which play a powerful economic and political role within countries like Egypt.
International development has a special need to overlook this internal involvement in the
places and problems it analyzes.
Mitchell, supra note 373, at 130.
381
Sardar, supra note 55, at 46. For example, the newly industrialized countries or larger Third World
countries such as China, India and Brazil are now engaged in manufacturing and industries that are no
longer found in the post-industrialized West. As the West abandons a particular activity, it is relegated to
the Third World. Sardar writes:
The present of the non-West is the past of the West, and the future of developing
countries is the present of the West. When the non-West reaches the point of
development, it has already become the past of the West, meaning the non-West has no
real future since its future is already known in Europe and America. Parts of the nonWest are the distant, pre-industrial revolution past of the North. The West was not just
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history; it is remade in the present and reconstructed in the future. … At each stage, it is
internalized more and more and becomes an integral part of the global consciousness. As
such, the future has been colonized by the West. … The future is defined in the image of
the West… taking us towards a single, determined future. … An illusion of accelerated
movement is produced to create an illusion of inevitability and to shroud the Eurocentric
dimension of the exercise. Conventionally, the colonization of the future was known as
Westernization. Now it goes under the rubric of globalization. The process that is
transforming the world into the proverbial global village, rapidly shrinking distances,
compressing space and time, is also shaping the world in the image of a single culture
and civilization. In this Eurocentric vision of the future, technology is projected as an
autonomous and desirable force. Its desirable products generate more desire; its secondorder side effects require more technology to solve them. Thus there is a perpetual
feedback loop and this self-perpetuating momentum has locked us in a linear, one
dimensional trajectory that has foreclosed the future of the non-West.
Id.
382

Tucker, supra note 64, at 3.
Id.
384
For a discussion of the gap between theoreticians and practitioners, see Narman & Simon, supra note at
362, at 1–2 (Noting practitioners are preoccupied with action, which is often not placed in a larger context,
while academics are concerned with understanding. Politician, planners and administrators would prefer to
not question development because it would threaten international consensus, instead devoting time to
international conferences where declarations are formulated that are to be translated into development
policy.).
385
These critiques and post-modernism in general have also been subjected to critique See Sardar, supra
note 55, at 45–46; supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. Sardar, supra note 55, at 45.
386
Simon, supra note 10, at 17.
387
Id. Professor Simon also cites “the collapse of socialism” which was viewed as an alternative model of
development, the growing economic diversity of countries in the Third World, increasing concern for
environmental sustainability; increasing assertiveness of voices from below and the rise of the postmodern
challenge to universalizing theories and conventional practices of development. Id.
388
See Arturo Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at
211, 216–20 [hereinafter Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era]; Watts, supra note 24, at 44, 57–60;
D.L. Sheth, Alternatives from an Indian Grassroots Perspective, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER,
supra note 11, at 329.
389
Watts, supra note 24, at 44– 46.
390
Id. at 45. Others state “development appears as a blunder of planetary proportions, an edifice which
shows cracks and is starting to crumble. At its most understated, there is a sense of malaise, a crisis of
developmentalism (practice) and an impasse in development thinking (theory).
391
Martin Minogue and Uma Kothari, Conclusion: Orthodoxy and its Alternatives in Contemporary
Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 179–80 [hereinafter Minogue &
Kothari, Conclusion].
392
Practitioners do usually agree, however, that development should have a human face, and that target
populations should be permitted to participate in planning programs and implementing them. Rahnema,
supra note 11, at 381.
393
Id. (Noting that there is a real danger that the many plausible arguments against development will be
used to take funds that would be used for development and direct them to other uses. Perhaps it is better to
spend the funds on agricultural projects, food, shelter and health care, however questionable such spending
may be from philosophical point of view, than on say security and weapons. But are they not connected.
Can repressive states obtain funds more easily when security requests are coupled with requests for
development assistance.). The recent spectacle at the UN, with the U.S. bribing or threatening states with
development aid to persuade them to vote for a resolution to use force in Iraq, really crystallizes this point.
See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT’L L.J. 27 (2003).
394
The so-called “Asian tigers” are often presented as proof that development can, and eventually will,
work. The economies of South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are frequently
383
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offered as proof of the viability of the Washington consensus and the triumph of export led growth based
on markets. Yet the rapid modernization of these nations had little to do with the international
development paradigm. For a devastating critique of the viability, sustainability and perhaps the myth of
the Asian Tigers, see O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 117.
395
Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 381. Professor Rahnema was UN
Representative in Mali and coordinator of other development projects. She also notes that the bulk of the
world’s resources are being utilized for arms and repressive governments and she questions whether or not
these funds might be better spent on development projects, even if they are flawed.
396
Kiely, supra note 7, at 36. Professor Kiely maintains that the idea that needs and poverty are solely
social and cultural constructions, mistake the word for the world and can create conditions wherein a
positive local politics of empowerment slides fitfully into an amoral politics of indifference. Id. In other
words, it may case the rich to simply disengage. See also Jan Nederveen Pieterse, My Paradigm or Yours?
Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development, 29 DEV. & CHANGE 343 (1998).
397
Simon, supra note 10, at 17.
398
Both authors have visited Southern countries and witnessed the need for these “comforts,” and thus take
these criticisms very seriously. See Sylvester, supra note 6.
399
It is maintained that the anti-development thesis does not take us “beyond the dualisms of modernity and
tradition, and dominant and dominated” and is rather vague about alternatives as it romanticizes local
cultures. Kiely, supra note 7, at 36–37. Professor Kiely notes that the idea that development always
undermines authentic cultures “can itself be considered a form of cultural imperialism, based on a long
tradition of romanticizing the ‘Other.’" Id.
400
See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 8. Professors Narman and Simon point out that silence is
often taken for lack of knowledge, while it could really arise out of courtesy, a desire to not disagree or
offend or to disclose information considered too private. Noting the targets of development, however,
have been quite “ingenious in filtering the advice and instructions received from development
professionals.” They have not been as passive as might be thought and have been able to be selective in
accordance with their own needs and perceptions through their cultural filters.
401
Given the amount of controlled exercised by international financial institutions over the economies,
politics and societal choices in the nations of the Third World, it does not seem to be too far from
colonialism. Indeed the discourse of racial, social, political and cultural superiority that justified
colonialism, underlies the development discourse. Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 926.
402
It has been argued that nations do not necessarily participate in the globalization project “as nations
inevitably on their way to modernity, but as pragmatic and strategic actors in a much more restricted game
that is governed by free trade, specializing in what can be done without the aid of protection, privatization,
and living within ones means.” O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 117.
403
Escobar posits that there is little point in speculating in the abstract about the character of a postdevelopment era, for if we accept that critical thought must be situated, then a discussion of these issues
should be practice-oriented, engaging with the political claims and actions of oppositional movements. See
Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, supra note 388, at 211, 216.
404
Simply put, “would the Third World have been better off without development assistance?” See, e.g.,
Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 7.
405
Id.
406
Of course, it is international capital that has decided that Western workers no longer will do certain
types of work. Chantel Thomas, Globalization and the Production of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1451 (2000) (discussing when corporations relocate to the Third World in search of cheap labor, less
governmental regulation and the like).
407
See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 1–2.
408
See Illich, supra note 42, at 88 (discussing the evolution of needs in development discourse, as it
evolved from food, clothing, materials for housing and mechanical power into a measurable standard such
as Gross National Product and then into notions of absolute poverty and minimum levels of human
decency).
409
Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 377, 379. The pre-development world was also
the colonized world and colonialism was a destructive force that disrupted communities, changed cultures
and had complex effects across very complex cultures. Thus developers did not confront pristine societies
untouched by the West. See Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528 (1999).
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410

Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 930–35.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text on poverty.
412
Illich, supra note 42, at 88, 96 (Noting in “traditional poverty, people could rely on finding a cultural
hemlock,” but development is a process which “lifts people out of their traditional cultural commons,”
dissolving such cultural bonds. Many are sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of worsening poverty
from which they will never be able to rise and meet their new needs.).
413
For a discussion of the modern-traditional dichotomy, see ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 75–80; Escobar,
Planning, supra note 157, at 135–36.
414
Cultures change, but development viewed tradition and Third World cultures as impediments to
modernization and thus to be eradicated in favor of development. Indeed development can be visualized as
a process by which people are lifted out of their cultural commons. In this transition, cultural bonds are
dissolved, even though culture can continue to tinge development in superficial ways – one need only
observe rural people recently transplanted to the megacities of the Third World. ESCOBAR, supra note 19,
at 75–80; Escobar, Planning, supra note 157, at 135–36.
415
McGee, Participating in Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY at 93, 95–96. (Noting early
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